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A B S T R A C T. A civil servant suit is a lawsuit brought by a government employee to declare
unlawful a statute, regulation, or command that he or she is charged with enforcing. The theory
of such suits is that the civil servant is uniquely situated to challenge such a command: unlike
members of the public, who have no particularized interest in whether the command is legal,
civil servants must choose between following the law and keeping their jobs. This Note is the
first to introduce, describe, and assess the practice of civil servant suits.
The key question is whether such suits should be permitted, and this Note explores both
doctrinal and normative answers to that question. As a doctrinal matter, I argue that it is
impossible to determine whether civil servant suits should proceed -whether civil servants have
Article III standing -without a more robust account of the rights and duties of civil servants.
Should civil servants be able to resist commands they believe to be unlawful? As a normative
matter, I suggest that the matter is more complex than it might seem. Civil servant suits might
promote executive compliance with the law and facilitate dissent from within the executive
branch. But unresolved questions regarding the structure of civil servant suits and the nature of
civil servant resistance may make them less effective than they might initially appear.
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INTRODUCTION
Debates raged in the 198os and 199os over whether the federal courts could
hear citizen suits: lawsuits brought by members of the public to challenge the
legality of official action.' Citizen suits, argued their proponents, were needed
in order to ensure that the executive branch complied with congressional or
constitutional commands; without the checks imposed by these private
attorneys general, the executive could under-enforce statutory or constitutional
rights for ideological reasons. But in a series of controversial decisions, the
Supreme Court largely turned this effort back. Citizen suits, explained the
Court, present only "generalized grievances about the conduct of
government,"2 not the kinds of "Cases" and "Controversies" that the federal
courts are permitted to hear. The resulting doctrine - then and now - precludes
many disputes about the legality of official action from being heard by the
federal courts.
But there is one set of plaintiffs who can disrupt this state of affairs, or so
this Note will suggest: the civil servants who are charged with enforcing the
statute, regulation, or command subject to challenge. Consider the following
examples:
* A state passes a new statute restricting the rights of gun owners. A
group of elected sheriffs sues on the ground that the sheriffs
"cannot enforce a statute that violates the fundamental
constitutional rights" of their constituents.3
* The Chair of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) instructs her employees to begin
investigating and prosecuting claims of discrimination based on
sexual orientation. An EEOC investigator sues on the ground that
Title VII does not permit such claims and that he cannot enforce an
ultra vires command.4
1. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737
(1984); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article
III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992).
2. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 479 (1982) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 1o6 (1968)).
3. See Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 13, Cooke v.
Hickenlooper, No. 13-cv-1300, 2013 WL 6384218 (D. Colo. Nov. 27, 2013). The district court
ruled that the sheriffs lacked standing. Cooke, 2013 WL 6384218, at *12.
4. See Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 7, Somers v. EEOC,
No. 6:13-cv-oo257, 2014 WL 1268582 (D.S.C. Mar. 26, 2014) [hereinafter Somers Response].
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The President of the United States announces that he will refrain
from enforcing the immigration laws against certain
undocumented immigrants brought to the United States as
children. Ten Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
agents sue on the ground that they are required by law to deport
such immigrants, commanded by their superiors not to, and "risk
adverse employment action if they disobey."'
These suits are predicated on a common theory: when a legislature passes
an unconstitutional statute or the executive unlawfully declines to enforce a
valid one, the executive-branch employee who must enforce the statute or
implement the command may suffer a legally cognizable injury, even if no one
else does. Such a civil servant-or so the argument goes-does not possess the
kind of "generalized grievance" the federal courts have no power to hear, for a
single reason: he or she may be fired, disciplined, or otherwise penalized for
disobeying. This theory is not merely an academic one - civil servants have
brought suit in exactly the situations described above, and others- but it has
received virtually no academic attention,6 and courts appear adrift in their
consideration of such claims.
This Note remedies that gap by introducing, describing, and critically
examining the theory behind what I call civil servant suits. It proceeds in four
Parts. Part I introduces the problem, describing the separation-of-powers
disputes that are the subject of these lawsuits; it traces the history of citizen
suits and their rejection by the Court; and it introduces the civil servant suit by
describing Crane v. Napolitano, the lawsuit brought by ICE agents to challenge
President Obama's policy permitting certain undocumented immigrants to
remain in the United States.7
The district court dismissed the investigator's claim as preempted by Title VII and declined
to reach the standing issue. Somers, 2014 WL 1268582, at *6 n.3.
S. See Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 3, Crane v. Napolitano, 920 F.
Supp. 2d 724 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (No. 3:12-cv-03247), 2012 WL 6633749 [hereinafter Crane
Response]. The district court found that the ICE agents had standing. Crane, 920 F. Supp.
2d at 740-41.
6. Several short paragraphs are devoted to the question in PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART &
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 182-83 (2d ed. 1973) ("Would
routine litigation even by upper level officials to test the constitutionality of statutes they are
charged with enforcing be desirable?"). But subsequent editions of the casebook pare down
and ultimately eliminate discussion of the topic.
7. Crane, 920 F. Supp. 2d 724.
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The key question for the federal courts and their academic interlocutors is
whether civil servant suits should be permitted, and this Note offers both
doctrinal and normative answers to that question. Part II examines the
question from a doctrinal perspective: do civil servants have standing to
challenge the statutes, regulations, and commands that they are charged with
enforcing as unlawful? I argue that the Court's standing doctrine alone cannot
furnish an answer. Echoing the doctrine's critics, I contend that we cannot
determine whether civil servants have standing without a better understanding
of the rights and duties of civil servants and their role in our system of
separation of powers. Do civil servants have the right to resist orders they
believe to be unlawful? Could our system even tolerate the expansion of
judicial review that would result?
I consider these questions in Parts III and IV. Part III examines the
statutory regime that sets out the rights and responsibilities of federal
employees, including the right-set out in statutes and the common law, but
rarely exercised and little understood- to resist unlawful orders. Part IV draws
out the implications of a robust understanding of the right to resist. The
consequences of allowing cases like Crane to proceed would be significant:
doing so could subject every executive order- at least every executive order that
requires the participation of civil servants- to judicial review. Many will reject
this prospect as dangerous, but I suggest instead that the dangers are
overstated; indeed, civil servant suits may represent one tool for ensuring
executive compliance with the rule of law. I conclude by evaluating the efficacy
of civil servant suits as a mechanism for legal compliance and for securing
dissent, and by comparing them to other - less radical - alternatives.
Two clarifying remarks are in order. First, this Note focuses primarily on
one form of civil servant suit: the suit brought to challenge executive action,
and particularly the legality of executive-branch enforcement policies. This is
not because challenges to executive action are the only form of civil servant
suit; the lawsuit brought last year by Colorado sheriffs to invalidate the state's
restrictive gun control statutes is an example of civil servants' assertion of
standing to challenge statutory commands, not executive demurrals. 8 But the
standing issues that civil servant suits appear to ameliorate are most acute in
the context of challenges to executive action. When the legislature passes a
statute, it will often be the case (as it was in Cooke, the case challenging the
Colorado gun regulation9 ) that a wide variety of regulated parties have
S. See Cooke, 2013 WL 6384218, at *12.




standing to challenge its validity. When the executive interprets, delays, or
declines to enforce a statute, no one will"0 - except, perhaps, the civil servant.
Second, the central claim of the Note is not that the federal courts are
awash with suits like Crane. Indeed, the unorthodox nature of the immigration
agents' standing argument in that case is presumably what made the question
so difficult for the court to resolve. But even if claims like Crane's are rare, they
are worth taking seriously. For one, if federal courts find that civil servants
have standing - as the court did in Crane - then presumably the courts will face
increasingly common attempts to use civil servant suits to avoid the strictures
of standing doctrine." More importantly, such suits squarely present the
question of how we are to understand the right of individual employees to
exercise resistance and dissent within the federal bureaucracy, and whether and
when we consider such resistance valuable. As I suggest below, even if we
conclude that civil servant suits are not a useful way of expressing dissent, it
may be worth paying more attention to how we allow civil servants' voices to
be expressed.
I. STANDING AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
It is by now well established that many disputes between the executive and
legislative branches will never be reviewed by a court. This is for a simple
reason: there is no plaintiff who is injured by many claims of executive
authority. But this understanding was not always the law. Part L.A provides a
brief sketch of the history of standing doctrine and the restrictions imposed,
over time, on the citizen suit. Part I.B sets out the key premise behind civil
servant standing: that standing doctrine prevents many separation-of-powers
disputes from being heard by the courts. Part I.C introduces the question of
whether civil servant suits are permitted and examines Crane v. Napolitano, the
paradigmatic civil servant suit.
A. A Brief History of Standing
The standing inquiry stems from the premise that "Article III of the
Constitution confines the federal courts to adjudicating actual 'cases' and
'controversies.'. 2 The Supreme Court has explained that Article III therefore
limits "the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary
1o. I set this reasoning out in more detail infra Part I.B.
ii. See, e.g., Somers Response, supra note 4, at 7 (citing Crane, 92o F. Supp. 2d at 738).
12. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III).
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context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the
judicial process." 3 Despite the seeming simplicity of the premise, however, it
has generated considerable confusion in practice. In an often-quoted phrase,
Justice Douglas once remarked that "[g]eneralizations about standing to sue
are largely worthless as such."' Standing doctrine, as one prominent account
skeptically notes, "has been described as 'permeated with sophistry,' as 'a word
game played by secret rules,' and ... as a largely meaningless 'litany' recited
before 'the Court... chooses up sides and decides the case.' 15
The doctrine of standing, in other words, is a contingent one, and a
judicially constructed one at that. Indeed, until the mid-twentieth century, as
an array of commentators have observed, there was no standing doctrine at
all.' 6 Instead, the question was whether a potential litigant had a cause of
action: a right granted either by the common law or by a legislature. In early
practice in England and in the United States, moreover, certain forms of action,
or writs, were available to all citizens without any showing of a "personal
stake" or an "injury in fact. 1 7 As late as 1961, Louis Jaffe was able to declare
that "the public action-an action brought by a private person primarily to
vindicate the public interest in the enforcement of public obligations-has long
been a feature of our English and American law."'
8
But the rise of the administrative state brought the matter into sharp focus.
The growth of the executive branch, and the rise in the number of statutes it
was charged with enforcing, led to concerns that congressional purpose could
be undermined not only by excessive regulation, but also by agency hostility to,
or inadvertent neglect of, statutory programs.' 9 Plaintiffs therefore argued, and
courts found, that parties as varied as displaced urban residents, listeners of
radio stations, and users of the environment could proceed against the
13. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
14. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970).
15. William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 221 (1988) (footnotes
omitted).
16. A concise history of the doctrine can be found at Sunstein, supra note 1, at 168-97. More
thorough accounts include James Leonard & Joanne C. Brant, The Half-Open Door: Article
III, the Injury-in-Fact Rule, and the Framers' Plan for Federal Courts of Limited Jurisdiction, 54
RUTGERS L. REv. 1 (2001); and Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat
Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REv. 689 (2004).
17. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 170-79.
18. Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARV. L. REv. 255, 302
(1961).




government to redress an agency's legally insufficient regulatory protection.'0
The theory undergirding these suits was that these plaintiffs were suffering
what they described as a "legal injury": the violation of a statute or
constitutional provision that they could plausibly argue was passed to protect
their interests.'
But the term "legal injury" is not self-explanatory, as Cass Sunstein, among
others, has suggested,' and perhaps it is for that reason that the Supreme
Court in a 1970 decision attempted to set out a more accessible-but still
expansive- definition of what was by then understood as its standing
doctrine.23 The Data Processing case shifted the inquiry from "legal injury" to
"injury in fact": under the new test, standing existed where plaintiffs could
show (a) "injury in fact, economic or otherwise"' and (b) injury "arguably
within the zone of interests"' of the regulatory statute. The second prong was
designed to endorse the expansive vision of standing recognized in prior
opinions, but the innovation that proved to be more significant was the Court's
identification of a preliminary, fact-based prong. 6
Most contemporary accounts of standing doctrine describe Data Processing
as the root of a broader change in the doctrine's development. 7 In the wake of
that case, and influenced by then-Professor Antonin Scalia's critique of the
20. See Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 932-37 (2d Cir. 1968); Office
of Commc'n of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, iooo-o6 (D.C. Cir.
1967); Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 6o8, 615-17 (2d
Cir. 1965).
21. This is not, of course, to claim that in this period anyone could bring any suit to redress what
he or she perceived as public misconduct; in the 196os and 1970s, the Court drew an outer
limit around self-described "taxpayer suits." See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 2o8 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); see
also Fletcher, supra note 15, at 267-72 (offering a nuanced account of these cases); Cass R.
Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1451-52 &
nn.88-89 (1988) (same); Sunstein, supra note 1, at 183-86 (describing the trend toward
recognizing standing in these cases).
22. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 186.
23. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
24. Id. at 152.
25. Id. at 153.
26. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 185-86.
27. See Fletcher, supra note 15, at 229 ("More damage to the intellectual structure of the law of
standing can be traced to Data Processing than to any other single decision."); Richard
Stewart, Standing for Solidarity, 88 YALE L.J. 1559, 1569 (1979) (reviewing JOSEPH VINING,
LEGAL IDENTITY: THE COMING OF AGE OF PUBLIc LAw (1978)) (describing Data Processing as
an "unredeemed disaster"); Sunstein, supra note i, at 185 (calling Data Processing a
'remarkably sloppy opinion").
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expansion of standing,8 the Court began to rely on the "injury in fact" prong
to dismiss claims brought by citizens to redress government misconduct.2"
Citizen suits, reasoned the Court, did not satisfy the standing requirements set
out in Data Processing because their plaintiffs - the beneficiaries of congressional
regulation rather than the targets, or objects, of such regulation -suffered no
"actual" injury from the government's failure to act.3° In Simon, for instance,
the Court denied standing to indigent people protesting a change in tax policy
on the basis that the plaintiffs had not shown that the policy directly caused
them to lose medical care; whatever injury they suffered, the Court reasoned,
was merely "speculative" in nature."
This trend culminated in the well-known Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
which denied standing to citizens claiming injury from the EPA's failure to
enforce environmental regulations, despite the existence of a statutory
provision explicitly allowing regulatory beneficiaries to bring suit.32 Lujan set
out the doctrine's now-"numbingly familiar"33 requirements: to have standing,
(1) the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact; (2) the plaintiffs injury
must be fairly traceable to the actions of the defendant; and (3) the relief
requested in the suit must redress the plaintiff's injury. 4 Late in the opinion,
now-Justice Scalia explicitly rejected the theory behind citizen suits as
inconsistent with Article III, asserting that "an injury amounting only to the
alleged violation of a right to have the Government act in accordance with law
[i]s not judicially cognizable."' These "generalized-grievance cases," he
explained, "cannot alone satisfy the requirements of Art[icle] III without
draining those requirements of meaning."
36
28. See Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978
SUP. CT. REv. 345; see also Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of
the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881 (1983) [hereinafter Scalia, The Doctrine of
Standing] (arguing against an expansive grant of standing).
29. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426
U.S. 26 (1976); Linda R1S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
3o. The requirement that plaintiffs show an injury "in fact"-as opposed to a "legal" injury- has
received significant criticism. See Fletcher, supra note 15, at 231-33 (arguing that the "injury
in fact" requirement requires courts to "sub silentio insert[] into [their] ostensibly factual
requirement of injury a normative structure of what constitutes judicially cognizable
injury").
31. Simon, 426 U.S. at 42, 44-45.
32. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
33. Fletcher, supra note 15, at 222.
3. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 56o-61 (1992).
35. Id. at 575.
36. Id. at 576.
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Allen v. Wright offers an even clearer indication of the Court's concern with
structural separation-of-powers issues in standing cases.17 In Allen, African-
American parents brought a nationwide class action claiming that the Internal
Revenue Service had violated its statutory "obligation to deny tax-exempt
status to racially discriminatory private schools.", 8 The result, the plaintiffs
claimed, was that they had been denied access to integrated schools. But the
Court turned the suit back on pragmatic grounds. If plaintiffs could obtain
judicial review merely by alleging failures in "systemwide law enforcement
practices," Justice O'Connor wrote for five Justices, "[t]hat conclusion would
pave the way generally for suits challenging, not specifically identifiable
Government violations of law, but the particular programs agencies establish
to carry out their legal obligations." 9 Because the case would require the
judiciary to examine-and potentially enjoin-the manner in which the
executive branch enforced a statute, she explained, it was a paradigmatic
example of one in which "the idea of separation of powers[] counsels against
recognizing standing. 
40
Allen v. Wright made explicit what Justice Scalia, in his first years as a judge
on the D.C. Circuit, had advocated: the judiciary should hesitate to interfere in
cases that pit the executive branch against the legislative branch,41 or more
generally, in which members of the public-in Sunstein's words, regulatory
beneficiaries4'- seek to have judges adjudicate the legality of official action. In
Justice Scalia's eyes, the suits that marked the high point of standing in the
1960s and 1970s represented an "overjudicialization of the processes of self-
governance."43 His position was that the Court should pull back on its
expansive grants of standing in favor of the democratic process, and, by and
large, it has. Justice Scalia's claim has received a healthy dose of criticism from
both the Court's more liberal members' and the academy,45 but it is clear that
his critics are, at least for now, in the minority.
37. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
38. Id. at 739.
39. Id. at 759-6o.
40. Id. at 761.
41. See Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing, supra note 28, at 891 (arguing that standing "assure[s]
that [courts] keep out of affairs better left to the other branches").
42. Sunstein, supra note 21, at 1433.
43. Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing, supra note 28, at 881.
44. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 55S, 589-9o (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); Allen, 468 U.S. at 766 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
45. See, e.g., Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN L. REv. 459, 463 (20o8) (calling
standing doctrine "ill-suited to most of the functions it is asked to serve"); Gene R. Nichol,
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B. Citizen Suits and the Separation of Powers
The constraints that the Court has imposed on citizen suits have had
significant consequences for our system of separation of powers, and those
consequences are growing rather than diminishing with time. The
consequences of the doctrine are clear. By imposing significant limitations on
the ability of diffuse groups of regulatory beneficiaries to bring suit, the Court
has restricted the availability of judicial review over a particular kind of
interbranch dispute: disputes over how the executive branch chooses to
administer, interpret, and enforce the law. The result is a doctrine that operates
asymmetrically in favor of the executive: while judicial review will often, if not
always, be available to determine the constitutionality of new laws, it will often
be unavailable when plaintiffs challenge the way in which those laws are
enforced.
Consider, as an example, the paradigmatic case of an agency's decision not
to bring an enforcement action.46 As Justice Rehnquist explained in Heckler v.
Chaney, "when an agency refuses to act it generally does not exercise its
coercive power over an individual's liberty or property rights," 47 and thus there
is no aggrieved individual with standing to sue. In all but the rarest cases, this
will be true even when the agency's non-enforcement decision is categorical
rather than individual in nature, and even when it is justified by an agency's
interpretation of its substantive statute rather than, for instance, a re-allocation
of its scarce resources. 4s The underlying dynamic is the same: because the act
of administering and implementing statutes inevitably involves tradeoffs, most
enforcement policies have no "victims" as a matter of black-letter standing
doctrine, and cannot be challenged in court.
What is perhaps less clear is that these consequences are growing with
time. This is because the structural features militating against judicial review of
executive action have been aggravated by the expanding scope of executive
Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DuKE L.J. 1141, 1168 (1993) ("Justice
Scalia's view of separation of powers threatens to constitutionalize an unbalanced scheme of
regulatory review.").
46. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828-35 (1985). Heckler analyzed whether the
Administrative Procedure Act permits review of agency inaction, and the Court did not
conduct a standing analysis. But as Lisa Bressman has explained, standing doctrine and
nonreviewability doctrine "[fairly interchangeably . . . bar judicial review of agency
inaction." Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness
Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1657, 1675 (2004).
47. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832 (emphasis omitted).
48. See Crowley Caribbean Transp., Inc. v. Pefia, 37 F. 3d 671, 674-77 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Ashutosh
Bhagwat, Three-Branch Monte, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157, 165 (1996).
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power -and in particular the expansion of the administrative state.49 The last
five decades have witnessed an enormous expansion in federal legislation
across a variety of domains, and today the federal government is intimately
involved in the day-to-day regulation of once-local fields, including
environmental law,"0 labor law,"1 and criminal law. 2 In each arena, executive
actors make decisions on a day-to-day, year-to-year, and administration-to-
administration basis about how to exercise the coercive power of the state. The
vast majority of these decisions, for the reasons outlined above, "injure" no
party and are accordingly not reviewable by courts.
Moreover, the increasing dysfunction of the legislative branch has led many
recent commentators to claim that we are living in an age of unprecedented
executive lawmaking. 3 The Obama Administration, in particular, has made
clear that it intends to enact components of its second-term agenda via
executive action if legislative progress is not made.' Many have decried aspects
of this approach as unlawful, even unconstitutional."5 Others have argued that
49. See generally Kate Andrias, The President's Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1031,
1033 (2013) (describing "[t]he growth of the administrative state and the expansion of
presidential power" in the twentieth century); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114
HARv. L. REv. 2245, 2246 (2001) ("We live today in an era of presidential administration.").
50. See Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56
EMORYL.J. 159, 159 (2006) (noting that "the federal government continues to address issues
of purely local effect" in environmental law).
51. See Benjamin I. Sachs, Despite Preemption: Making Labor Law in Cities and States, 124 HARv.
L. REV. 1153, 1153 (2011) ("It would be difficult to find a regime of federal preemption
broader than the one grounded in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).").
52. See Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds Can Learn From the States,
109 MICH. L. REv. 519, 579 (2011) (observing that "the federal government has intervened in
a host of areas of traditional local control").
53. See Jack M. Balkin, The Last Days of Disco: Why the American Political System Is Dysfunctional,
94 B.U. L. REv. 1159, 1193-95 (2014) (arguing that "a dysfunctional Congress tempts the
executive to begin to act more and more unilaterally"); David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the
Separation of Powers, t24 YALE L.J. 2, 27-36 (2014), (offering a similar account); see also
Andrias, supra note 49 (chronicling the rise of muscular executive action); Kagan, supra note
49 (to similar effect).
54. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in the State of the Union Address (Feb.
12, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2o13/o2/12/remarks-president-state
-union-address [http://perma.cc/WGUg-N58S] ("But if Congress won't act soon to protect
future generations, I will.... I will direct my Cabinet to come up with executive actions we
can take, now and in the future, to reduce pollution, prepare our communities for the
consequences of climate change, and speed the transition to more sustainable sources of
energy.").
ss. Much commentary along these lines is ideological in nature. See, e.g., 158 CONG. REc.
S286-87 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 2012) (statement of Sen. Alexander) ("The President's recess
appointments not only show disregard for the Constitution, they show disregard for every
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executive action is necessary to overcome an increasingly partisan political
landscape. s6 But regardless of the lawfulness of the underlying executive
actions, one thing is clear: many such questions will never be resolved in court,
because no party has standing to sue.
Take, for example, President Obama's decision to delay the enforcement of
the employer mandate provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (ACA).' The Act requires covered employers to begin providing ACA-
compliant healthcare to their employees by January i, 2014.58 Despite the fact
that the Act contains no provision authorizing the executive branch to "waive"
the requirement, temporarily or otherwise, 9 the White House announced in
July 2013 that it would suspend the Act's reporting requirement, and the
penalties associated with non-compliance, until 2015, citing as authority only a
statutory provision authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to "prescribe all




Commentators immediately questioned whether the delay was lawful.6'
But who would have standing to force a judge to answer that question? Not the
employers who would otherwise have had to comply with the law's reporting
requirements: no "injury." Not the Democratic congressmen who voted for the
individual American who chooses liberty over tyranny, President over King.");
Michael McConnell, Democrats and Executive Overreach, WALL ST. J., Jan. io,
2012, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBooo1424oS297o2o4257o457715o66199o141658
[http://perma.cc/M6C4-S7S6]. Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit K. Garg, Presidential Inaction and the
Separation of Powers, 112 MICH. L. REv. 1195 (2014); and Zachary S. Price, Enforcement
Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671 (2014), however, offer more in-depth
academic critiques.
56. See, e.g., Obama, supra note 54; see also Pozen, supra note 53, at 58-70 (outlining the
conditions under which such interbranch "self-help" can be legitimate).
57. See Jackie Calmes & Robert Pear, Crucial Rule Is Delayed a Year for Obama's Health Law, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 2, 2013, http ://www.nytimes.com/2ol3/o7/o3/us/politics/obama-administration
-to-delay-health-law-requirement-until-2o15.html [http://perma.cc/F7W6-A37K].
58. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 5§ 1513-14, 124 Star. 119,
253-58 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
59. Cf David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265,
281-84 (2013) (discussing other provisions of the ACA for which Congress did delegate the
power to waive major requirements).
60. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2012); see Letter from Mark J. Mazur, Assistant Sec'y for Tax Policy,
to Fred Upton, Chairman, House Comm. on Energy and Commerce et al. 2 (July
9, 2013), http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Upton
-Treasury-ACA-2o13-7-9.pdf [http://perma.cc/3LJ9-3WTC].





law: foreclosed by a 1997 decision imposing curbs on congressional standing.62
And certainly not the law's putative beneficiaries, low-income Americans who
might have hoped the ACA would force their employers to improve their
insurance policies: too speculative. As Michigan law professor Nicholas Bagley
wrote shortly after the delay was announced, "Unless I'm missing something,
no one has standing to challenge the waiver - whether it's legal or not."
6
,
The conventional wisdom holds that President Obama's other executive
initiatives are equally likely to evade judicial review. The President's announced
policy not to prosecute low-level marijuana users in states that have legalized
marijuana sales 64 causes no "injury" to even the most steadfast opponent of
legalization. His decision, in the wake of United States v. Windsor, to
implement facially discriminatory federal benefits laws in a non-discriminatory
manner is almost certainly immune from challenge, despite the burdens it will
place on the public fiSC. 6 6 Even his announcement, in the wake of widespread
criticism, that the administration would "fix" the ACA by allowing health
insurers to renew non-compliant plans that they would otherwise have had to
cancel 67 may be immune from suit on standing grounds.
68
62. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997); see also Jack Goldsmith, Suing the President for Executive
Overreach, LAWFARE (June 30, 2014, 10:48 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2o14/o6
/suing-the-president-for-executive-overreach [http://perma.cc/H9LB-DXGD] (making the
same claim with respect to House Speaker John Boehner's proposed lawsuit against
President Obama).
63. Nicholas Bagley, Does the Administration Have the Legal Authority to Delay the Employer
Mandate? And What If It Doesn't?, THE INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (July 3, 2013,
12:42 PM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/does-the-administration-have
-the-legal-authority-to-delay-the-employer-mandate-and-what-if-they-dont [http://perma
.Cc/MW5H-2SH9]; see also Nicholas Bagley, The Legality of Delaying Key Elements of the ACA,
370 NEWENG. J. MED 1967, 1969 (2014) ("[N]o one has standing to sue over the employer-
mandate delays .... .").
64. See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att'y Gen., to U.S. Att'ys (Aug.
29, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3o52o13829132756857467.pdf [http://
perma.cc/6VLN-QMMJ].
65. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
66. See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att'y Gen., to John Boehner, Speaker, U.S.
House of Representatives (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources
/55720139415153091o116.pdf [http://perma.cc/W9TP-PFN9].
67. Ashley Parker & Robert Pear, Obama Moves to Avert Cancellation of Insurance, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2ox3/1X/15/us/politics/obama-to-offer-healh-care
-fLx-to-keep-plans-democrat-says.html [http ://perma.cc/Z4J6-CFXB ].
68. See Nicholas Bagley, Litigating Obama's Like It/Keep It Fix: The Question of Standing,
INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (Nov. 19, 2013, 1:oo PM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com
/wordpressAitigating-obamas-like-it-keep-it-fix-the-question-of-standing [http://perma.cc
/4BLJ-WH68] (observing that any resulting injury may "never materialize, it may be too
speculative, and too loosely connected to the administrative fix, to support standing"). But
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Importantly, the impact of standing doctrine on claims of executive
authority is not limited to Democratic administrations. In August 2o12, for
instance, Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney declared that his first
act as President would be to waive all state obligations under the ACA.6 , It is
hard to imagine who would have standing to challenge that action: the same
doctrine that shields President Obama's delay from suit would likely shield a
putative President Romney's waiver. Moreover, the broad grant of
discretionary authority that President Obama has claimed might seem to
permit future Republican presidents to selectively enforce laws that are of
greater significance to Democrats, including federal environmental and labor
statutes. David Martin has sounded warnings along these lines, noting that the
blanket non-deportation policies called for by some immigration advocates
would have enabled a President Romney to "thwart[] .. .the new consumer
protection laws by refusing to spend half the money Congress continually
provides for their enforcement." 70 Martin didn't need to add that, if Romney
had done so, then no one would have had standing to challenge him -at least
according to the conventional wisdom. The project of this Note is to suggest
that the conventional wisdom may be wrong.
C. Civil Servant Suits
When the President declines to enforce a statute, there is one party who
suffers a legally cognizable injury: the executive-branch employee who must
carry out an order that he or she believes is unlawful. Such a civil servant -or
so the Note's argument goes-does not possess the kind of "generalized
see Eugene Kontorovich, The Obamacare Fix's Legality, State Law and Standing, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Nov. 23, 2013, 12:33 PM), http://www.volokh.con/2o13/11/23/obamacare-fixs
-legality-state-law-standing [http://perma.cc/SUE4-4S72] (arguing that a state that has
passed legislation to implement the ACA might be able to challenge the "fix").
69. Republican Primary Debate, WASH. POST (Aug. 11, 2011), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/2012-presidential-debates/republican-primary-debate
-august-11-2011 [http://perma.cc/4W4X-JES7] ("And if I'm president of the United States,
on my first day, I'll direct the [S]ecretary of [Health and Human Services] to grant a waiver
from Obamacare to all 50 states."). There is a provision in the ACA that allows the Secretary
of Health and Human Services (HHS) to waive the requirements for states, but only if she
determines that a state's proposed plan will provide health care coverage "at least as
comprehensive" and "at least as affordable" "to at least a comparable number of its
residents" as that required by the Act's own scheme and will "not increase the Federal
deficit." 42 U.S.C. 5 180 5 2(b)(1) (2012).
70. David A. Martin, A Lawful Step for the Immigration System, WASH. POST, June 24, 2012,
http ://www.washingtonpost.com/opinons/a-lawful-step-for-the-immigration-system/2ol2
/o6/24/gJQAgToOoV-story.html [http://perma.cc/Z6US-HN 72]; see also Love & Garg,
supra note 55 (arguing that presidents should be faithful to the enacting Congress).
124:758 2014
CIVIL SERVANT SUITS
grievance" the federal courts have no power to hear, for a single reason: he or
she may be fired, disciplined, or otherwise penalized for disobeying.'
Accordingly, the civil servant - and perhaps only the civil servant - has standing
to challenge the President's order in court. This argument is an unorthodox
one, but it is not an academic one: courts are hearing such claims right now,
and in some cases, they are concluding that civil servants have standing. This
section introduces the civil servant suit by describing Crane v. Napolitano, the
paradigmatic such lawsuit.'
The story of Crane begins in December 2010, when the Development,
Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act fell several votes short of
passing in the U.S. Senate.' The DREAM Act would have provided
conditional permanent residency to certain immigrants of "good moral
character" who had arrived in the United States as minors, graduated from
U.S. high schools, and lived in the country continuously for at least five years
prior to the bill's enactment.74 The bill was generally popular7" and had passed
the House of Representatives, but it was opposed by conservative Republicans
in the Senate., 6 The December vote against cloture, by a margin of 55-t0-41,
7. Title 5 defines the "civil service" to include "all appointive positions in the ... Government
of the United States, except positions in the uniformed services." 5 U.S.C. § 2101(1) (2o12).
This definition is a broad one: it includes career employees and political appointees, and
encompasses some positions exempted from the statutory protections that generally
accompany federal service. See id. § 2302(a)(2)(B). But for present purposes, the statutory
definition will do: while the differences in rights and responsibilities between, for instance,
a career prosecutor and his presidentially appointed supervisor might bear on the normative
questions I take up in Part IV, the implications of such a distinction lie largely beyond the
scope of the Note.
72. The Crane suit was filed in 2012, when Janet Napolitano was Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security. In subsequent stages of litigation it has been known variously as Crane
v. Beers and Crane v. Johnson, see FED. R. CIV. P. 25(d), but for the sake of simplicity I
describe it in this Note only as Crane v. Napolitano.
73. David M. Herszenhorn, Senate Blocks Bill for Young Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec.
18, 201o, http://www.nytimes.com/2o1o/12/19/us/politics/19immig.html [http://perma.cc
/AsCN-Z686].
74. See Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2010, S. 3992, 111th Cong. §
4(a) (2010).
75. Jeffrey M. Jones, Slim Majority of Americans Would Vote for DREAM Act Law,
GALLUp POLITICS (Dec. 10, 2010), http://www.gallup.con/poIV145136/slim-majority
-americans-vote-dream-act-law.aspx [http://perma.cc/W62W-2XWV] (reporting that fifty-
four percent of Americans would vote for the DREAM Act and forty-two percent would vote
against it).
76. See Julia Preston, House Backs Legal Status for Many Young Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
8, 201o, http://www.nytimes.com/2o0lo/12/o9/us/politics/ogimmig.html [http://perma.cc
/6KGG-QN7H].
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was seen as the end of the line for the bill, especially given the newly elected
Republican majority in the House.'
Stymied in Congress, immigrant advocacy groups turned to the White
House. The so-called "DREAMers" and their allies enlisted Democratic
senators 7 and high-profile immigration scholars79  to lobby the Obama
Administration to take executive action to spare young immigrants from
deportation. When Republican Senator Marco Rubio announced that he
would introduce his own version of the DREAM Act, immigrant advocates
indicated that they would consider supporting such an effort8 - potentially
handing a crucial political win to the Republicans. It did not take long for the
White House to act.
On June 15, 2012, President Obama announced from the Rose Garden that
he would take "a temporary stopgap measure" that would "lift the shadow of
deportation" from DREAMers by allowing them to remain in the country
indefinitely. 8' Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet
Napolitano issued a memorandum to the directors of DHS's component
branches "setting forth how, in the exercise of our prosecutorial discretion,
[DHS] should enforce the Nation's immigration laws against certain young
people who were brought to this country as children and know only this
country as home. '' 82 The Napolitano Memo instructed them to "immediately
exercise their discretion, on an individual basis, in order to prevent [these
77. See Herszenhorn, supra note 73.
78. See Letter from Senator Harry Reid et al., to President Barack Obama (Apr. 13,
2011), http://www.scribd.com/doc/53o14785/22-Senators-Ltr-Obama-Relief-for-DREAMers
-4 [http://perma.cc/JO,.B-S6CY].
79. See Letter from Professor Hiroshi Motomura et al., to President Barack Obama (May
28, 2012), http://www.law.uh.edu/ihelg/documents/ExecutiveAuthorityForDREAMRelief
28May2o12withSignatures.pdf [http://perma.cc/MY4D-AGE5] (arguing that there was
"clear executive authority for several forms of administrative relief for DREAM Act
beneficiaries").
8o. Peter Wallsten, Marco Rubio's Dream Act Alternative a Challenge for Obama on
Illegal Immigration, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics
/marco-rubios-dream-act-alternative-a-challenge-for-obama-on-illegal-immigratiOn/212
/o4/2s/gIQAsyqxhTstory.html [http://perma.cc/9KEZ-S5R8].
81. Julia Preston & John H. Cushman Jr., Obama to Permit Young Migrants to Remain in U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2o2/o6/16/us/us-to-stop-deporting
-some-illegal-immigrants.html [http://perma.cc/K6WM-L4VL].
82. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, U.S. Sec'y of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar,
Acting Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al., Exercising Prosecutorial
Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children at 1





immigrants] from being placed into removal proceedings or removed from the
United States." 83
But as the Memo made clear, notwithstanding the instruction to exercise
discretion "on an individual basis," the command was categorical in nature.
Any noncitizen who met the five criteria the Memo outlined-that is, who
came to the United States under the age of sixteen, had resided in the U.S. for
at least five years, was in or had graduated from high school or had served in
the armed forces, had not been convicted of a serious crime, and was thirty
years old or younger-should not be placed into removal proceedings. 4 The
policy immediately came under attack from conservative Republicans and some
scholars as unlawful, and perhaps unconstitutional.8 It is possible to imagine
arguments against the policy announced in the Memo that are grounded in
constitutional law, statutory interpretation, and administrative procedure, and
indeed many of those arguments have been made and robustly rebutted.
86
But for the purposes of this Note, what matters is that it is exceptionally
unlikely that a federal court would ever hear any such claims. For the reasons
described above, an enforcement policy-even one as "rule-like" as the one
announced in the Napolitano Memo-is perhaps the paradigmatically
83. Id. at 2.
84. See id. ("ICE should exercise prosecutorial discretion, on an individual basis, for individuals
who meet the above criteria by deferring action for a period of two years .... " (emphasis
added)).
85. Attacks on the policy were widespread in the conservative press. See, e.g., The O'Reilly Factor
(Fox News television broadcast Aug. 31, 2011) (featuring an interview with Charles
Krauthammer describing the Napolitano Memo as an attempt to "essentially enact[] the
DREAM Act through regulation," and describing it as "a pretty radical sort of 'in your face'
at the constitutional system"), http://foxnewsinsider.com/2oll/o8/31/krauthammer-obama
-is-using-regulations-to-bypass-congress-and-change-our-country [http://perma.cc/L6PD
-4DA7]. The most prominent academic criticism of the policy accuses the President of
having abrogated his duty to "take Care that the laws be faithfully executed." See Robert J.
Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration's Nonenforcement of
Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEx. L. REV. 781, 784-85
(2013); see also Love & Garg, supra note 55, at 1198 (describing the events that led to the
Crane suit as "[p]erhaps the most prominent example of unilateral policymaking through
inaction").
86. Compare, e.g., Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 85, at 785-86 (attacking the policy on
constitutional grounds), with Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Statutory Nonenforcement
Power, 91 TEx. L. REv. SEE ALSO 115 (2013) (defending it on constitutional grounds). The
Crane suit, see infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text, attacks the policy primarily on
statutory grounds, an attack gamely rebutted by David A. Martin, A Defense of Immigration-
Enforcement Discretion: The Legal and Policy Flaws in Kris Kobach's Latest Crusade, 122
YALE L.J. ONLINE 167 (2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/a-defense-of-immigration
-enforcement-discretion-the-legal-and-policy-flaws-in-kris-kobachs-atest-crusade [http://
perma.cc/59UK-WBEV].
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unreviewable separation-of-powers dispute: because it "injures" no one, there
is no one with standing to sue. That defense would extend to even the most
persuasive attack on the Napolitano Memo, namely that the policy within it
should have been promulgated pursuant to notice-and-comment rulemaking:
even Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claimants must have standing. 87 As
Chief Justice Burger noted thirty years ago, a lawyer would be hard-pressed to
find a case in which a federal court "reviewed a decision of the Attorney
General suspending deportation of an alien .... This is not surprising, given
that no party to such action has either the motivation or the right to appeal from it."88
But Crane v. Napolitano, the case brought to challenge the Memo, was not a
garden-variety public-law challenge: it was a civil servant suit, brought by ten
ICE officers to challenge the policy that they were charged with implementing.
Chris Crane, the lead plaintiff, was an Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) agent stationed in Salt Lake City and the head of the ICE Agents and
Officers Union; his fellow plaintiffs were ICE agents stationed across the
country. 89 They had standing, they argued, because they had been "directly
commanded to do something by 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(a)(3) and (b)(2)(A)"-that
is, arrest and deport unlawfully present immigrants -"directly commanded to
do the opposite by the [Napolitano Memo]," and "risk[ed] adverse
employment action if they disobey[ed]." 9" In other words, they argued, they
faced a Hobson's choice: follow what they believed to be the law, or risk losing
their jobs.9"
This argument reflects the theory behind the civil servant suit, and the
puzzle it poses. Disputes like Crane appear to be precisely the kind of
"generalized-grievance cases"9 2 that contemporary standing doctrine intends to
keep out of the courts. But the civil servant confronted with such a choice-
follow the law or lose one's job -seems just as clearly, at least at first blush, to
87. See Klamath Water Users Ass'n v. FERC, 534 F.3d 735, 738 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding no
standing even for plaintiffs who participated in the agency rulemaking process).
88. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 957 n.22 (1983) (emphasis added).
89. Amended Complaint at 3-5, Crane v. Napolitano, 920 F. Supp. 2d 724 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (No.
3:12-cv-03247) [hereinafter Crane Complaint]; see also Julia Preston, Single-Minded Mission
to Block an Immigration Bill, N.Y. TiMEs, June 1, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com
/2013/o6/o2/us/for-chris-crane-a-quest-to-block-an-immigration-bill.html [http://perma.cc
/6263-5 S7L].
go. Crane Response, supra note 5, at 3.
91. Id. at 6 ("The Fifth Circuit has recognized that a plaintiff facing such a 'Hobson's choice'
between two injuries-in-fact possesses standing."). The decision they faced was probably
not, in fact, a Hobson's choice. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1076 (rev. ed. 1993).
92. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992).
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possess the kind of "personal stake in the outcome"93 that standing doctrine
requires. Although Crane has been lambasted as an ideologically motivated suit
rather than a genuine conflict between an employee and an employer,94 the
facts pled by the plaintiffs suggest that their commitment is genuine: one ICE-
agent plaintiff issued an immigration warrant against an immigrant who was
eligible for relief under the Memo, despite orders to the contrary, and received
a three-day suspension as a result.9"
What are federal courts faced with suits like Crane to do? The Crane court,
somewhat to the surprise of most commentators, held that the plaintiffs were
right. The ICE agents, reasoned the court, would be "exposed to adverse
employment consequences" if they disobeyed their superiors, and accordingly,
the court found they had standing to challenge the legality of the Memo. 96 But
the court's analysis, while plausible, seems open to critique. Can it possibly be
the case that civil servants can evade the requirements of Article III standing
simply by proffering a legal interpretation that differs from that of their
superiors? Should it be the case?
II. CIVIL SERVANT STANDING
This Part takes up the first of those questions. It asks, as a doctrinal matter,
whether civil servant suits are permitted under Article III-whether, in other
words, civil servants have standing to challenge the legality of the programs
they are charged with enforcing. Part II.A addresses the constitutional
requirements of standing set out in Lujan. Part II.B addresses the objection that
93. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
94. The suit is almost universally described not by reference to its plaintiffs but by reference to
its attorney, Kansas Secretary of State Kris Kobach, an anti-immigration advocate and one-
time advisor to Mitt Romney. See, e.g., Alex Byers, Kris Kobach, Informal Romney Adviser,
Files Immigration Lawsuit, POLITICO (Aug. 23, 2012, 8:53 PM), http://www.politico.com
/news/stories/o81i2/8oo69.html [http://perma.cc/GT2A-YNR4]; Martin, supra note 86, at
167 (describing Crane as "Kris Kobach's [1]atest [c]rusade").
9s. Crane Complaint, supra note 89, at ii.
96. Crane v. Napolitano, 920 F. Supp. 2d 724, 739-40 (N.D. Tex. 2013). Importantly, the court
ultimately dismissed the challenge for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding that the
Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) foreclosed the ICE officers' suit. Crane v. Napolitano, No.
3:12-cv-03247, 2013 WL 8211660, at *1 (N.D. Tex. July 31, 2013). I discuss this development
and its implications on the ability of civil servants to bring suit infra notes 153-154 and 175-
179. Notably, the court declined to withdraw its standing opinion, which has subsequently
been cited as authority that civil servants have standing to challenge executive actions. See,
e.g., Somers Response, supra note 4, at 7. The civil servants have appealed to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. See Brief of Appellants, Crane v. Johnson, No. 14-10049 (5th
Cir. May 16, 2014).
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these cases present only "generalized grievances" and are therefore not suitable
for judicial resolution. I argue that the doctrinal inquiry cannot provide a
satisfactory answer to the question of whether civil servant suits should
proceed. That is because the important inquiry is not, as the court in Crane
initially framed it, a question of standing at all, but a question of rights: do
government employees have the right to resist orders they believe to be
unlawful? I take up that inquiry in the following Part.
A. Constitutional Standing
The requirements of constitutional standing are familiar: (i) the plaintiff
must have suffered an injury in fact; (2) the plaintiffs injury must be fairly
traceable to the actions of the defendant; and (3) the relief requested in the suit
must redress the plaintiffs injury.9 7 I will set aside the third requirement here,
because I believe it is amply met: if civil servants will suffer injury as a result of
an unlawful command, then a court's declaration that the command is
unlawful and should be set aside clearly would redress the injury. But the first
and second requirements raise difficult questions, as I explain below. I consider
each requirement in turn.
1. Injury in Fact
Civil servants might argue that they suffer any one of three "injuries" when
they are commanded to do something unlawful. First, they might argue that
the burden of compliance is itself an "injury in fact"-that is, in the case of
Crane,98 that the act of not deporting undocumented immigrants constitutes an
injury that gives rise to standing. Second, civil servants might argue that the
act of compliance gives rise to standing because it requires them to violate the
law (or, put differently, violate their oaths of office), itself an "injury in fact."
Finally, they might argue that the consequences of either action- compliance or
disobedience-give rise to standing: compliance because they may be subject to
some sort of penalty for violating the law; disobedience because they will face
adverse employment consequences for resisting. These consequences, civil
servants might argue, are "injuries in fact."
Each of these claims of "injury" is analytically distinct. One common
response, though, might be that none of these putative injuries should be
97. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2685-86 (2013) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 56o-
61).
98. Although I borrow the facts of Crane in this Note, the arguments I draw out in this Part are
not the arguments that the plaintiffs (or the Department of Justice) made in the suit itself.
124:758 2014
CIVIL SERVANT SUITS
understood as sufficient to confer standing because the prospect of civil servant
standing is itself undesirable. I put off this slippery-slope argument for now
because-in the words of the Supreme Court-it "elides the distinction
between two principles: the jurisdictional requirements of Article III and the
prudential limits on its exercise."99 I address the possibility that standing
should be denied on separation-of-powers grounds - because the dispute
presents only a "generalized grievance" -in the subsequent section.
It seems clear, at least on first blush, that the first two putative injuries-
the burden of compliance and the violation of one's oath-cannot satisfy the
standing inquiry under current law. Consider first the argument that
the burden of compliance itself is an "injury in fact." This argument resonates
with Justice Scalia's observation in Lujan that the standing inquiry
"depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the
action (or forgone action) at issue."' 0 Under this argument, civil servants must
themselves be considered the objects of the statutes they enforce; those statutes,
the argument goes, determine what civil servants can permissibly do, just as
they determine what regulated parties (here, immigrants) can permissibly do.
So there should be "little question"'0 ' that civil servants, like regulated entities,
have standing to challenge interpretations of those statutes, or so the plaintiffs
in Crane argued.
Such an argument seems intuitively implausible: can it possibly be the case
that civil servants are injured when their duties change?0 2 But it is worth
pausing to ask why. One answer might be that we simply do not understand
substantive statutes as regulating the conduct of those who implement them.' °3
Civil servants' responsibilities, one might argue, are not within the "zone of
interests" of the substantive statutes they enforce. 0 4 Note that this response
sounds not in contemporary standing doctrine but in the language of the 196os
and 197os: it is about "statutory injury," not "injury in fact." The
contemporary response must instead be that civil servants are not "injured"
when their responsibilities change, perhaps because those responsibilities were
9g. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2685.
loo. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (emphasis added).
ioi. Id.
102. Indeed, the Crane court quickly rejected this argument. Crane v. Napolitano, 92o F. Supp.
2d 724, 737-38 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (holding that the allegation that plaintiffs "must change the
way they conduct their duties while performing their jobs as ICE agents" was not a
sufficient injury-in-fact to satisfy the standing inquiry).
1O3. But cf Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2466, 2470 (1996) (describing constitutional
criminal procedure as "a species of substantive criminal law for cops").
104. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
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voluntarily incurred. One way of making this point is to reason that the
baseline for civil servants, under this formulation, is different from the baseline
for regulated entities: the latter have the right to be left alone, but civil servants
have no right to remain civil servants.' 5 I will return to this question later.
The second putative injury-the violation of one's oath-is open to a
similar critique. But while standing law provides no easy answers to the civil
servants' first claim (that compliance is itself an injury), a single dated case,
cited by the Crane plaintiffs and defendants alike, provides the foundation of
an answer to the civil servants' second (that violating their oaths might be). In
1968, a local school board brought suit to challenge a New York law requiring
public school authorities to lend textbooks to all schoolchildren, including
those attending parochial schools.1°6 The board argued that the state law
violated the Establishment Clause, a claim the New York Court of Appeals
rejected.1 °7 The Supreme Court affirmed. ,s Although the suit, Board of
Education v. Allen, was not primarily a standing challenge, the Court addressed
the standing question in an oblique footnote:
Appellants have taken an oath to support the United States
Constitution. Believing § 701 to be unconstitutional, they are in the
position of having to choose between violating their oath and taking a
step - refusal to comply with § 701 - that would be likely to bring their
expulsion from office and also a reduction in state funds for their school
districts. There can be no doubt that appellants thus have a 'personal
stake in the outcome' of this litigation.' 9
Allen would appear to suggest that the violation of one's oath can give rise
to "injury in fact," and several courts held accordingly in its wake."0 It is easy
w05. In this way, contemporary standing analysis is vulnerable to the critiques made so
powerfully by Fletcher and Sunstein in the late 198os and early 199os. See Fletcher, supra
note 15, at 233 (arguing that the "injury in fact" requirement means that "the Court is either
insisting on something that can have no meaning beyond a requirement that plaintiff be
truthful about the injury she is claiming to suffer" or is "sub silentio inserting into its
ostensibly factual requirement of injury a normative structure of what constitutes judicially
cognizable injury").
io6. Bd. ofEduc. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 238-39 (1968).
107. Id. at 240-41.
io8. Id. at 238.
iog. Id. at 241 n.5 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
11o. See Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1O9O, 11OO (2d Cir. 1973) (concluding that one "faced
with what he deems a conflict between his oath to support the United States Constitution
and his duty under [a] law" has standing to challenge the latter); see also Regents of Univ. of
Minn. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 56o F.2d 352, 363-64 (8th Cir. 1977) (to similar
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enough to distinguish Allen by its vintage: it pre-dated contemporary standing
doctrine in general, and Data Processing in particular. Indeed, several circuits
have held in the intervening decades that Allen is no longer good law. "' But we
need not go that far to conclude that Allen does not support the claim that the
violation of one's oath itself confers standing. The Allen plaintiffs, after all,
"ha[d] to choose between violating their oath and taking a step" with immediate
consequences."1 2 Their successful theory of standing, in other words, was the
most plausible argument in favor of civil servant standing: that the consequences
of the civil servants' choice -and particularly the consequences of the choice to
disobey an unlawful command- constitute "injury in fact."
The argument based on consequences- the third putative injury-is
considerably more difficult for standing doctrine to defeat. For one, civil
servants who comply with unlawful commands (or enforce unconstitutional
statutes) may face concrete and adverse consequences from doing so. Elected
officials, like the school board officials in Allen or the elected sheriffs in Cooke,
may be voted out of office. State and local officials may face lawsuits under 42
U.S.C. § 1983,"' and federal officials may face lawsuits under Bivens.1 4 Some
of these potential consequences may, to a court, seem implausible or
insufficiently imminent." ' But some may not.
Even more plausibly, civil servants who disobey commands they believe are
unlawful are likely to face concrete and adverse consequences for their
disobedience. The facts of Crane bring this possibility into focus: one plaintiff
received a three-day suspension as a result of his decision to follow what he
believed to be the requirements of federal immigration law. 1, 6 But it is easy to
imagine a set of facts that bring the claim into even sharper relief: a career civil
servant who disobeys orders by, for instance, issuing an environmental report
effect); Akron Bd. of Educ. v. State Bd. of Educ., 490 F.2d 1285, 1290-91 (6th Cir. 1974)
(same).
mii. See, e.g., Drake v. Obama, 664 F.3d 774, 779-81 (9 th Cir. 2011); Donelon v. La. Div. of
Admin. Law ex rel. Wise, 522 F.3d 564, 567 n.5 (5th Cir. 2008); City of S. Lake Tahoe v. Cal.
Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 625 F.2d 231, 234-38 ( 9th Cir. 198o); Finch v. Miss. State
Med. Ass'n, 585 F.2d 765, 773-75 ( 5th Cir. 1978).
112. Allen, 392 U.S. at 241 n.5 (emphasis added).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). But cf. Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV.
885 (2014) (arguing that state and local officials face few consequences from damages
actions because they are indemnified by their employers).
114. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
115. Cf. Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013) (describing "the well-established
requirement that threatened injury must be 'certainly impending"' (quoting Whitmore v.
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (199o))).
116. Crane Complaint, supra note 89, at 11.
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that her political supervisors do not wish published, and as a result is fired
from her position at the EPA. Can it be the case that that civil servant has
suffered no "injury in fact"? It clearly cannot: the loss of one's job simply must
be considered an injury, regardless of one's normative priors.'H7 Nothing within
the four corners of the injury inquiry demands a contrary result.
2. Causation
There is, however, at least one credible response to the claim that civil
servants suffer an "injury in fact" when they disobey commands they perceive
to be unlawful: the civil servant who disobeys such a command does so
voluntarily. The civil servant's "injury," this argument goes, may be concrete,
but it is self-inflicted: it is caused not by the lawfulness of the underlying
command (or lack thereof) but by the employee's own decision to disobey.
This is roughly what the defendants in Crane claimed, although they did not
frame it as a matter of causation. They argued that "a plaintiff cannot satisfy
standing simply based on the prospect of a voluntary choice to risk an adverse
employment action based on a personal opinion about what the law
requires.""s
The "voluntariness" response seems intuitively plausible." 9 But again it is
worth asking why. Describing a civil servant's decision to disobey a command
that he or she believes to be unlawful as a voluntary one does not simply mean
that he or she chose it freely. For the purposes of the standing inquiry, it must
mean something more. A corporation's decision to violate a new regulatory
statute, for instance, can just as plausibly be described as voluntary, yet no one
would question whether the corporation has standing to challenge that
statute.20 Instead, we must mean that the civil servant (unlike the regulated
117. The various statutes that protect employees from job-related discrimination, harassment,
and retaliation all define "adverse action" to include termination. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012) (defining, in Title VII, "unlawful employment practice" to include
"discharge"); S U.S.C. § 7512(1) (2012) (defining, in the Civil Service Reform Act, "covered
action" to include "removal"). Questions of "standing" in the employment discrimination
context are infrequent and, when they arise, turn on complex questions of statutory
interpretation. See, e.g., Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170 (2011) (finding
constitutional and statutory standing for a third-party retaliation claim under Title VII).
,,8. Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 2, Crane v.
Napolitano, 920 F. Supp. 2d 724 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (No. 3:12-cv-03247) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter Crane Reply].
119. The Crane court, of course, disagreed. See Crane v. Napolitano, 920 F. Supp. 2d 724, 739-40
(N.D. Tex. 2013).




entity) has no right to disobey the order. Civil servants, under this reading,
simply have no particular duty to carry out their responsibilities in a lawful
manner, or at the very least have no right to resist commands that they believe
violate that duty.
Consider, in this light, the claims of the ICE agents in Crane. They argued
that they had been ordered to act unlawfully- ordered to refrain from
prosecuting undocumented immigrants in violation of 8 U.S.C.
§ 122 5(b)(2)(A), which instructs "the examining immigration officer" to
initiate deportation proceedings against any immigrant "not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted." 2' As a result, the agents had been or
would be subjected to disciplinary action. But the key question for the court
should not have been whether the threat of disciplinary action constituted an
"injury" for the purposes of Article III. It should have been whether the ICE
agents could permissibly act on their own interpretation of the immigration
statutes - that is, whether such disobedience was lawful or merely "voluntary."
What is noteworthy about this dispute is that no matter who is right -that
is, no matter if civil servants have the right to resist unlawful commands or
not-the argument sounds not in "injury in fact" but in legal injury: what are
the rights and responsibilities of the civil servant, and when are they
abrogated? The Article III standing analysis developed in the 198os and 199os
deemphasized "legal injury" in favor of a putatively objective inquiry into
"injury in fact." But such an inquiry cannot furnish an answer to the threshold
question faced by the Crane court: can civil servants sue? The tools required to
answer this question-the question behind civil servant suits-lie not in the
domain of standing, but in the domain of rights and entitlements. The Crane
court concluded that the ICE agents' suit could proceed because they "alleged a
sufficient injury-in-fact," a finding that is itself hard to dispute.' But the court
erred by failing to ask the predicate question: do civil servants have the right to
resist? After a brief detour to address an unresolved objection, I take up that
question in Parts III and V.
B. "Generalized Grievances"
It might be objected that whether or not civil servants have the right to
resist unlawful orders, the resulting suits should be barred for a wholly distinct
reason: they present only "generalized grievances about the conduct of
government."'23 The Court's resistance to "generalized-grievance cases ""
121. 8 U.S.C. 5 1225(b)(2)(A) (2012).
122. Crane, 920 F. Supp. 2d at 740.
123. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, io6 (1968).
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traces to the taxpayer suits it turned back in the 196os and 1970s; in these
cases, the Court has said, an undifferentiated plaintiff "claim[s] only harm to
his and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and
laws, and seek[s] relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it
does the public at large. 1 25
Both the nature of this rule and its exact metes and bounds are far from
clear. As recently as 2004, the Court described the bar against generalized
grievances as one of three "prudential" factors counseling against standing in
particular cases.2 6 But the very concept of a "prudential" standing doctrine sits
in tension, as the Court noted in 2014, with the longstanding principle that "a
federal court's obligation to hear and decide cases within its jurisdiction is
virtually unflagging.' 1 7 In the last decade, accordingly, the Court has gradually
refined and recharacterized the "prudential" standing factors as either statutory
or constitutional in nature -a trend that culminated in the Court's unanimous
opinion in Lexmark, which concluded that the federal courts "cannot limit a
cause of action . ..merely because 'prudence' dictates.12S Accordingly, the
Court insisted in a footnote that the bar against generalized grievances must be
understood to prohibit certain suits "for constitutional reasons, not 'prudential'
ones."
29
Regardless of whether the bar against generalized grievances is
constitutional or prudential, however, it seems clear that it need not defeat civil
servant suits. For one, if the bar is constitutional rather than prudential in
nature, then it must be justified (as the Court has stated) by the presumption
that judicial intervention in these cases is "unnecessary to protect individual
rights.""3 ° On this understanding, to describe a suit as a "generalized-grievance
case" is simply to state that the conditions of Article III standing are not
satisfied because no plaintiff will be injured by the challenged act. 3' That
124. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992).
125. Id. at 573-74.
126. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004); see also Valley Forge
Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475
(1982) (grounding the Court's reluctance to entertain such suits in the "counsels of
prudence").
127. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
128. Id. at 1388.
129. Id. at 1387 n.3.
130. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 12 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)).
131. Cf Richard M. Re, The Rule Against Just One Generalized Grievance, RE'S JUDICATA (Oct. 2,
2014, 9:00 PM), http://richardresjudicata.wordpress.com/2oi4/io/o2/the-rule-against-just
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condition necessarily fails where, as will sometimes be the case, civil servant
plaintiffs can plausibly allege that they have been or will be injured. At stake in
civil servant suits are federal employees' "rights to be free from adverse
employment consequences" ' - at least if such a right exists.
If, on the other hand, the bar against generalized grievances does more
than simply bar suits by plaintiffs who lack Article III standing-if the bar is
better considered in some sense "prudential," Lexmark notwithstanding-it is
clear that it is a hopelessly indeterminate rule, one that cannot tell us with any
certainty whether civil servant suits should proceed. What does it mean, as
Justice O'Connor once wrote, for "the idea of separation of powers [to]
counsel[] against recognizing standing" ?' The history of standing makes clear
that there is no way to answer this question except with regard to a kind of
normative baseline about when judicial review is appropriate and when it is
not.
3 4
In other words, the bar against generalized grievances - like the Article III
standing analysis itself- cannot defeat the civil servants' claim that their suits
should proceed. It can only direct us to the doctrinal and normative questions
that lie behind the standing inquiry: do government employees have the right
to resist orders they believe to be unlawful? Can our system of separation of
powers accommodate the expansion of judicial review that would result?
III. THE RIGHT TO RESIST
Our instinctive response to the question of whether civil servants have the
right to resist may be the same as the Justice Department's: we may not want
to empower each federal employee to act on his or her own "personal opinion
about what the law requires."'3 s As it turns out, though, this view is not the
law-or at least it may not be. As a matter of law, civil servants have been
protected for decades-first under the common law, and today by state and
federal whistleblower statutes- from being disciplined for disobeying unlawful
commands. As a matter of practice, however, it seems clear that the right is
rarely exercised, and rarer still in circumstances like Crane, where disputes
between the government and civil servants turn on the legality of high-profile
-one-generalized-grievance [http://perma.cc/JK47-E3GX] (arguing that the rule against
generalized grievances "is rapidly becoming extinct").
132. Crane v. Napolitano, 92o F. Supp. 2d 724, 741 (N.D. Tex. 2013).
133. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984).
134. See Elliott, supra note 45, at 460 (criticizing the claim that standing doctrine "is built on a
single basic idea-the idea of separation of powers" (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 752)).
135. Crane Reply, supra note 118, at 2.
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programs. There is a right to resist, in other words, but we lack a thorough
understanding of what it entails.
Under the common law, civil servants dismissed for insubordination, or
disobedience, could assert the defense of illegality: in other words, that the
order they disobeyed was an illegal one and that their disobedience,
accordingly, was justified., 6 Under the classic formulation, a civil servant
could be dismissed only for "refusal to obey an order that a superior officer is
authorized to give."13 7 Similarly, civil servants-like at-will employees in the
private sector-could claim in some instances that their dismissal for refusal to
obey an illegal order constituted a violation of public policy. 38 But the treatises
report only a scarce number of cases in which public employees claimed this
common-law right."39 Robert Vaughn, one of the few scholars to have
examined the issue in detail, observes several reasons for this dearth of case
law, including the "extraordinary personal resources . . . required to resist
authority" and the tendency of public employees to instead plead violations of
their First Amendment rights.' 40
Whatever the reason, the cases are rare and diverse, not only in their factual
content but their legal analyses. Some consider politically salient constitutional
claims: in Parrish v. Civil Service Commission, for instance, a county social
worker was terminated for refusing to participate in a series of unannounced
136. See Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 425 P.2d 223, 223 (Cal. 1967); 2 MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET
AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.8 n.19 (4th ed. 2009). The common-law right persists today in
the decisions of the Merit Systems Protection Board, the administrative agency charged with
adjudicating federal employment disputes. See Bonanova v. Dep't of Educ., 49 M.S.P.R.
294, 302 (1991).
137. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 870 (9 th ed. 2009) (emphasis added) (defining
"insubordination").
138. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 136, at § 9.10; STEVEN L. WILLBORN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 147-80 (3 d ed. 2oo2).
139. See sources cited supra note 138.
140. Robert G. Vaughn, Public Employees and the Right to Disobey, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 261, 261-62
n.2 (1977). Vaughn's thoughtful but dated account, with the exception of a student
comment written shortly after its publication, Manfried H. Stucki, Harley v. Schuylkill
County- Section 1983 Protects a "New" Constitutional Right Arising from an "Old" Duty, 198o
UTAH L. REV. 617, remains the only academic treatment of this subject. Recently, a pair of
articles has taken up related topics. See Adam Shinar, Dissenting From Within: Why and How
Public Officials Resist the Law, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 6Ol (2013); Daniel E. Walters,
Litigation-Fostered Bureaucratic Autonomy: Administrative Law Against Political Control, 28 J.L.
& POL 129 (2013). But Shinar's treatment is quite abstract: it sets out a typology of official
resistance that includes examples as disparate as the public school officials who resisted
Brown v. Board of Education and the San Francisco gay-marriage litigation. Walters's
treatment, by contrast, addresses only a single form of civil servant dissent, the decision to
participate (for instance, as a witness) in litigation challenging administrative action.
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eligibility checks on welfare recipients; the social worker challenged his
termination in court, arguing that the practice was illegal and
unconstitutional.' 4 ' The county subsequently abandoned the effort.4' Other
cases involve low-profile disputes between employers and employees: in
Stephens v. Department of State Police, for instance, a state trooper challenged his
dismissal for refusing a command to act in contravention of his state statutory
right to take leave for military training. 43 Oregon courts ordered the
department to reinstate the trooper.'
Over the course of the century, the common-law right became codified in a
number of state statutes,45 and, ultimately, in federal law. The Whistleblower
Protection Act of 1989 (WPA)'46 was enacted "to improve the protections for
federal employees who disclose, or 'blow the whistle' on, government
mismanagement or fraud."47 Before its enactment, statutory protections for
civil servant dissidents were generally seen as toothless, with few incentives for
whistleblowers to report misconduct148 The WPA established a large number
of reforms, including, most prominently, a sweeping overhaul of the U.S.
Office of Special Counsel (OSC), the independent agency charged with
representing civil servants within the executive branch. But in a largely
unnoticed provision, 49 Congress also expanded the scope of civil servants'
141. Parrish, 425 P.2d at 224.
142. Id. at 224-25.
143. 526 P.2d 1043, io44 (Or. Ct. App. 1974), rev'd, 532 P.2d 788 (Or. 1975).
144. Stephens, 532 P.2d at 790.
145. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S 23-1501(3)(c)(i) (2014); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-2104(3) (2014); LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. S 23:967(A)(3) (2014); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 83 3 (1)(D) (2014);
MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 149, 5 185 (b)( 3) (2014); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.932(1)(3) (West
2014); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 5 275-E:3 (2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3(C) (West 2014);
N.Y. LAB. LAw S 740(2)(c) (McKinney 2014); N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 126-8 5 (b)(1) (2014); UTAH
CODE ANN. S 67-21-3(3) (West 2014); see also Robert G. Vaughn, State Whistleblower Statutes
and the Future of Whistleblower Protection, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 581, 617-20 (1999) (canvassing
these statutes).
146. Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §5 1201-1222 (1994 & Supp. Ill
1997)).
147. S. REP. No. 100-413, at 1 (1988).
148. See Thomas M. Devine, The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989: Foundation for the Modern
Law of Employment Dissent, 51 ADMIN. L. REv. 531, 533-36 (1999).
149. The provision is briefly discussed in the statute's legislative history but only superficially.
See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 100-274, at 15, 16, 28, 39 (1987) (discussing a predecessor provision,
which prohibited supervisors from taking such action against an employee "for failing to
follow orders to disobey a law"); 135 CONG. REC. 4514 (1989) (reporting that the bill
.establishes a new prohibited personnel practice, which protects employees in their right to
refuse to obey an order that would require the individual to violate a law").
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substantive rights by adding what is currently S U.S.C. § 2302(b)( 9 )(D). This
provision purports to protect civil servants from being disciplined, demoted, or
terminated "for refusing to obey an order that would require [them] to violate
a law."'5°
But there is little jurisprudence interpreting this statutory provision. The
most prominent history of the establishment of the WIPA describes this
provision as the culmination of a "twenty year campaign for public employees
challenging their employment duty to act illegally on command," but there is
little evidence that such a campaign existed.'' To my knowledge, in the
quarter-century since the provision was enacted, only a handful of cases in the
Federal Reporter have cited the statute. Until Crane, the only reported decision
to pay attention to the statute was a 1997 district-court case, Olsen v. Albright, s2
which ruled for a civil servant plaintiff challenging the legality of the State
Department's use of racial profiles in visa processing. Even the decisions of the
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB)- the administrative agency charged
with adjudicating federal employment disputes - rarely cite this provision,
which suggests that federal employees instead rely primarily on the analogous
right to disclose unlawful behavior. '
In other words, to the extent that civil servants have the right to resist
commands that they perceive to be unlawful, we know little about the content
of that right. Indeed, the case law is rife with unanswered questions, several of
which go to the heart of the right. First, are civil servants entitled to directly
resist allegedly unlawful commands, or must they "obey first, grieve later" ?'
This question, though somewhat tangential to this Note, is critical to the
exercise of the right in practice. And the MSPB's decisions, at least, appear to
be in deep tension on this point. One line of cases concludes that civil servants
"do not have the unfettered right to disregard a law ...merely because
substantial reason exists regarding the constitutionality or validity of that
150. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(D) (2012).
151. Devine, supra note 148, at 553. Devine cites only Vaughn, supra note 140, as evidence for such
a campaign.
152. 99o F. Supp. 31, 36-37, 40 (D.D.C. 1997).
153. S U.S.C. § 23 02(b)(8)(A)(i) (2012) (defining retaliation against an employee on the basis of
any disclosure of information that the employee "reasonably believes evidences any violation
of any law, rule, or regulation").
154. Garrison v. Dep't of Justice, 72 F.3d 1566, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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law,"' while another holds that civil servants need not obey "an order that the




Second, and relatedly, when civil servants resist commands that they
perceive to be unlawful, must they be right? Must the command, in fact, be
unlawful? This question is at the heart of the government's assertion, in Crane,
that civil servants cannot act on their own "personal opinion[s] about what the
law requires."'57 At most, one might argue, they are entitled to act on what the
law in fact requires. This is a question that preoccupied Robert Vaughn, who
advocated for a standard based not on illegality in fact, but on the civil
servant's reasonable and good-faith belief that a command or instruction was
illegal. 8 Many state statutes explicitly state whether a civil servant's reasonable
belief that a command is illegal will suffice to state a violation,"59 but the federal
WPA contains no such indication. 6, Moreover, even in those states that permit
civil servants to raise the defense that they reasonably and in good faith
believed a command to be unlawful, it is not clear whether a court should
adjudicate the merits of the dispute or inquire only into the employee's state of
mind.
Finally, what is the relationship between civil servant disobedience and civil
servant disclosure? Many statutory schemes -including, most prominently, the
federal WPA-codify the right to disobey in statutes that primarily protect
whistleblowers: civil servants who disclose information to the public that would
otherwise remain hidden, including, as in the federal scheme, information
about the "violation of any law, rule, or regulation."' 6' But are civil servant
plaintiffs, like the ICE agents in Crane, properly considered whistleblowers?
The prototypical whistleblower speaks truth in the face of power, exercising his
155. Gragg v. U.S. Air Force, 13 M.S.P.R. 296, 299 (1982).
1S6. Fleckenstein v. Dep't of Army, 63 M.S.P.R. 470, 474 n.3 (1994). Fleckenstein purports to
overrule Gragg, but subsequent adjudications continued to follow Gragg and cabin
Fleckenstein. E.g., Cooke v. U.S. Postal Serv., 67 M.S.P.R. 401, 407 (1995).
157. Crane Reply, supra note 118, at 2.
158. See Vaughn, supra note 140, at 272 (arguing that "employees should be protected from
disciplinary action if they in good faith refuse to obey an order with the reasonable belief
that it is unconstitutional or illegal"); Vaughn, supra note 145, at 619 (same).
isg. Compare, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2)(C) (2014), and Bordell v. Gen. Elec. Co., 667 N.E.2d
922 (N.Y. 1996) (requiring a violation in fact), with MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 149,
§ 185(b)(3) (2014) (resting the cause of action on the employee's reasonable belief).
16o. Ferrone v. Dep't of Labor, 797 F.2d 962, 965 (Fed. Cir. 1986), appears to suggest that a civil
servant's reasonable and good-faith belief is insufficient to defend against disciplinary
action. But the case predates the WPA's enactment and proceeds on an insubordination
theory.
161. 5 U.S.C. § 23o2(b)(8)(A)(i) (2012).
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right to share information with the public on matters that he may be uniquely
positioned to disclose. The prototypical civil-servant resister, by contrast, must
act in the face of contrary authority -she must, in Heather Gerken's words,
"dissent[] by deciding "162- and it will often be the case that in doing so she
shares no new information, discloses no secret wrongdoing. Should she still be
protected by the same statutes that protect whistleblowers ?163
What jurisprudence there is interpreting the right to resist-state and
federal, common-law and statutory- offers no hard-and-fast answers to these
questions. Nor is it the project of this Note to take on a comprehensive
evaluation of the costs and benefits of whether such a right should be robust,
as Robert Vaughn argues, or vanishingly narrow, as the Justice Department
claimed in Crane. In particular, this Note does not examine the benefits that a
robust right to resist would confer upon individual civil servants: the security
in their jobs, the empowerment with respect to their supervisors, and more.
Instead, it focuses in the following Part on several large-scale systemic benefits
that a robust right might provide, in particular on the benefits of the kind of
"dissent" that civil servant disobedience might be seen to represent.
Before turning to that project, the fate of Crane bears mention. In an ironic
turn, it was the Whistleblower Protection Act itself- the statute that confers
upon federal employees their right to resist -that resulted in the dismissal of
the suit. In a brief filed late in the initial stages of the case, the Justice
Department argued for the first time that the ICE agents' claim was "at root, a
federal employment dispute for which this Court lacks jurisdiction. "164 After
ordering additional briefing, the district court agreed: the Civil Service Reform
Act (CSRA) and WPA, the court reasoned, together established a
"comprehensive and exclusive remedial scheme" for federal employment
disputes, and so the ICE agents - while they had standing to sue - had chosen
the wrong venue for their complaint.165 Accordingly, the court dismissed the
suit, leaving an exploration of the contours of the right to resist for another
day, and another forum.
162. Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1745, 1747 (2005).
163. One answer to this question, at least for federal workers, may be that the civil servant who
disobeys- unlike the civil servant who discloses -cannot claim protection based on a
reasonable but erroneous belief that official conduct is unlawful. Compare 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(8)(A) (2012) (protecting employees who "reasonably believe[]" they are
disclosing information regarding the violation of a law), with id. S 2302(b)(9)(D)
(containing no such "good-faith" clause).
164. Crane Reply, supra note 118, at 5 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(9)(C)(ii)).
16s. Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-cv-03247, 2013 WL 821166o, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 31, 2013).
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IV. CIVIL SERVANTS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
This Part moves beyond the doctrinal inquiry over civil servant suits. It
asks whether, as a normative matter, our system of separation of powers would
benefit from allowing civil servants to challenge the statutes, regulations, and
commands they are charged with implementing. Part IV.A sets out the case for
recognizing a robust right to resist and permitting such suits to proceed. It
argues that civil servant suits may vindicate important rule-of-law virtues and
that, more broadly, there are systemic benefits to increasing the salience of civil
servants' claims. Part IV.B sounds a note of caution, identifying the ways in
which civil servant suits may ultimately disappoint their advocates. Part IV.C
points to alternative mechanisms for vindicating the rule of law and amplifying
the voices of civil servants in our system of separation of powers.
A. The Rule of Law
It is clear that recognizing a robust right to resist, and permitting civil
servant suits to proceed, would permit judicial review of disputes that
traditional standing doctrine would bar. The prototypical civil servant dispute
involves the executive branch's enforcement of statutory or constitutional
commands, such as the dispute in Crane over the legality of the Napolitano
Memo, or a hypothetical dispute over the legality of President Obama's delay
of the requirements of the Affordable Care Act. Such enforcement decisions
stand, as Kate Andrias has explained, "at the very core of executive
responsibility." 6 6 A robust doctrine of civil servant standing could allow civil
servants who thought such decisions were unlawful to challenge them in court.
The consequences of such a doctrine might be significant: broadly conceived,
civil servant suits could subject the day-to-day mechanics of governance,
including enforcement decisions large and small, to judicial review.
A critic would argue-perhaps crudely-that this is simply too much
judicial review. Those with a healthy skepticism of the role of courts will find
that argument appealing. 6, It is easy for those who doubt the systemic benefits
of judicial review, in other words, to get off the bus here. But I want to take
seriously the more nuanced argument that judicial review is unwarranted, and
undesirable, when cases present questions that should be handled instead by
166. Andrias, supra note 49, at 1033; see also Price, supra note 55, at 673 (describing enforcement
discretion as "central to the operation of both the federal criminal justice system and the
administrative state").
167. Cf. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2697-98 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority opinion for its "exalted conception of the role of [the Supreme
Court] in America").
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the political branches. In then-Professor Scalia's words, expansive grants of
standing result in "an overjudicialization of the processes of self-
governance.', 68 It seems clear that many who share this sentiment would
describe civil servant suits in exactly this manner and conclude that they
produce few benefits and many costs for our system of separation of powers.
Such concerns, however, may be overstated. Consider the obstacles that
still confront civil servants Who wish to bring suit. First, as a preliminary
matter, note that some executive actions do not require the participation of civil
servants, or at least not many; President Obama's announced plan to delay the
Affordable Care Act might fall into this category. Even if civil servants work in
agencies that take such actions, they would be missing the essential ingredient
of a civil servant suit -disobedience. There is no standing if there is no order to
disobey.
Moreover, even those civil servants who are tempted to disobey orders that
they perceive to be unlawful must overcome significant barriers to doing so.
First, at the most fundamental level, they must care enough about the order-
or believe assiduously enough that it is unlawful-to risk the adverse
employment consequences of disobeying it., 69 This natural impediment to
bringing suit is likely to dissuade many putative civil-servant plaintiffs from
testing the legality of the orders they are instructed to enforce. Even if they do
bring suit, civil servants-at least those challenging agency enforcement
practices-must demonstrate that their actions are not barred by the APA and
the case law interpreting it. Many such suits will be immune from review on
these grounds, because the enforcement decisions that they challenge are either
"committed to agency discretion by law" 7 or otherwise barred by the
nonreviewability doctrine set forth in Heckler v. Chaney. 7'
168. Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing, supra note 28, at 881.
16g. The authors of the 1973 edition of the Hart and Wechsler casebook questioned the Supreme
Court's grant of standing in Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), but seemed to
do so on the limited ground that the plaintiffs in that case had not actually taken action to
disobey the law. See BATOR ET AL., supra note 6, at 182 ("If [the official] truly believes the
statute to be unconstitutional, could he not refuse to enforce it and raise the question when
challenged-e.g., as a defense to dismissal?"); see also Vaughn, supra note 140, at 261-62 n.2
(noting that "extraordinary personal resources are required to resist authority").
170. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012).
171. 470 U.S. 821 (1985). Additionally and alternatively, some courts might adopt reasoning like
Crane's, limiting such challenges to enforcement policies that conflict with statutes that
appear to impose affirmative duties on civil servants themselves. Crane Response, supra note
5, at 2 (arguing that "[t]he standing of the ICE Agent Plaintiffs is based first and foremost
on the fact that the statutory obligations of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3) and (b)(2)(A)fall directly




Finally, even when civil servants do bring suit, and their suits proceed to
the merits, many will lose. David Martin has demonstrated why, as a matter of
statutory interpretation, the Crane plaintiffs' claims lacked merit.172 And few
plaintiffs will have claims even as strong as the ICE agents' in Crane; federal
judges might easily dismiss most civil servant suits on the grounds that no law
has been violated. Even a robust doctrine of civil servant standing might, in
other words, primarily permit a check on egregious statutory and constitutional
violations, not the policy-based deviations that are the product of day-to-day
enforcement decision making.
Would judicial supervision over such issues be pro- or anti-democratic? It
seems there is at least a credible argument that-Justice Scalia's critique
notwithstanding- civil servant suits would promote rather than undermine the
rule of law. In the rare instances where civil servants proceeded to court,
enhanced judicial review over enforcement policies would ensure that
Congress's will was not frustrated by executive branch actors acting for
ideological reasons. In such cases, it is the denial of standing rather than the
grant of standing that diminishes democratic accountability, for the simple
reason that the denial risks keeping the executive branch's decision less salient
and less likely to be corrected not only by the judiciary, but also by Congress.
Admittedly, this claim bears some resemblance to the argument that pro-
review advocates made in the 196os and 197os-an argument implicitly
rejected by the Court's more restrictive standing decisions.' 73 But things have
changed over the decades. The administrative state has grown larger, the use of
enforcement discretion has become endemic, and critics both on and off the
Court have expressed increasing concern about the ease with which the
executive branch can neglect congressional commands. 74 These trends have
made clear, moreover, that we lack the doctrinal and even the theoretical tools
to determine whether executive enforcement policies are problematic. In recent
work, Jeffrey Love and Arpit Garg have attempted to theorize executive
inaction, arguing as a general matter that the executive should be faithful to the
enacting Congress."5 Zachary Price has similarly suggested that courts should
172. See Martin, supra note 86, at 169 (describing the ICE agents' claim as "superficially
attractive" but incorrect).
173. See Sunstein, supra note i, at 184 (noting that the key premise underlying standing for
beneficiaries was the concern that political interference would defeat the implementation of
statutory enactments, resulting in "government failure").
174. See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1877-78 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(offering an extended critique of the growth of the regulatory state).
175. Love & Garg, supra note 5, at 1213 (arguing that, even if the executive need not exercise the
maximum authority granted by Congress, its enforcement of the law must nevertheless
exceed the law's minimum requirements).
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look askance on executive-branch enforcement policies that make categorical,
rather than case-by-case, determinations.176 The problem with both theories, as
Price implies, is that no one has standing to raise them in court.' 77
Permitting civil servant suits to proceed would solve that problem. If civil
servants have standing to sue, then the federal courts could consider exactly the
claim that Love, Garg, and Price want to make: that some executive
enforcement policies amount to malfeasance. Consider the question of whether
and to what extent enforcement discretion is committed to the President, a
question with both constitutional and statute-specific answers. zs Price, in the
most thorough treatment of the topic, argues for a pair of countervailing
presumptions -a presumption in favor of executive discretion over individual
cases, and a presumption against executive control over substantive
policymaking via the categorical use of enforcement discretion, each
"defeasible," or alterable by Congress. 79 Recognizing standing in civil servant
suits might require the courts to address the degree of enforcement discretion
constitutionally entrusted to the President, a potentially fraught question. But
it should first require them to define the discretion that Congress intended to
confer on the executive-a question more capable of judicial resolution, and
one that might promote rather than diminish the accountability of the
executive branch to Congress and the public, and further the rule of law.
More broadly, permitting the suits described in this Note to proceed might
also serve to amplify the voice of an important constituency in the burgeoning
administrative state: the civil servant. In recent years, a small but vital
literature has begun to examine the role that civil servants - and the civil service
as an institution -play in our system of separation of powers.' 8 Jon Michaels,
176. Price, supra note 55, at 704.
177. See id. at 687 ("[Clourts appear quite unlikely to compel enforcement against the President's
wishes, even assuming a party with standing to bring a justiciable challenge may be
found."). Love and Garg, for their part, believe "it is unlikely that... standing would keep
the plaintiffs out of court." Love & Garg, supra note 55, at 1228 n.165. But they offer little
support for their claim, and I believe that they significantly understate the difficulties in
establishing standing to challenge inaction.
178. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5; In re Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d 255, 262-66 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(opinion of Kavanaugh, J.); Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 85, at 798-803; Prakash, supra
note 86, at 117-21; Price, supra note 55, at 688-711.
179. Price, supra note 55, at 704-07.
i8o. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006); Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule,
Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032 (2011); Gillian E. Metzger, The
Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J.
423 (2009); Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2444396 [http://perma.cc/777T-EMMJ].
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for instance, argues that the "civil service has institutional, cultural, and legal
incentives to insist that agency leaders follow the law. ',1 Both Michaels and
Neal Katyal point to statutory protections- including the anti-partisan Hatch
Act, the CSRA's tenure protections, and the whistleblowing provisions of the
WPA- that strengthen the civil service's ability to serve as a check on politically
motivated executive action.182 If the civil service is as beneficial as Michaels,
Katyal, and others have claimed, then permitting the federal courts to referee
high-profile disputes between civil servants and their supervisors might check
not only politically motivated actions, but also illegal ones.
At their most promising, civil servant suits might serve as a constraining
force, ensuring that the executive branch complies, as Love, Garg, and Price
would have it, with congressional will. Moreover, they might do so by
channeling the voices of actors with built-in institutional legitimacy: the civil
servants whose loyalties, as Michaels observes, "generally lie with their
professional commitments . . . , the programs they advance, and the
organizations they serve. ''183 If we believe that our system of separation of
powers benefits from the kind of checking function that Michaels and Katyal
posit the civil service performs, extending the statutory rights they describe to
official resistance and permitting civil servant suits to proceed might
underscore that important role.
B. "Garden-Variety Employment Disputes"
This section sounds a note of caution. Even accepting that civil servant
suits might serve an important function in theory, I suggest several reasons to
doubt that they will be useful in practice. The simplest reason is that, as noted
above, civil servant suits will likely be rare, limited to those circumstances in
which civil servants' commitments are strong enough to outweigh the risk of
adverse employment consequences and in which they raise claims plausible
enough to overcome motions to dismiss.184 The presumption that enforcement
action is committed by law to agency discretion, in particular, is likely to make
successful civil servant suits rare indeed.""s But even in cases in which these
threshold barriers are overcome-even in the "egregious" cases where civil
servant suits proceed to the merits - there are reasons to doubt that they will be
particularly effective at securing the rule-of-law benefits described above.
181. Michaels, supra note 18o (manuscript at 18) (footnote omitted).
182. Katyal, supra note 18o, at 2331-32; Michaels, supra note 18o (manuscript at 18-19).
183. Michaels, supra note 18o (manuscript at 19).
184. See supra notes 169-172 and accompanying text.
i85. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828-35 (1985).
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First, as a doctrinal matter, some such claims - in particular, constitutional
claims- face a daunting set of procedural hurdles to obtaining judicial review,
at least where federal officers are concerned. As the dismissal of Crane suggests,
it does not appear to be the case, at least under current law, that civil servants
are empowered to bring APA claims in federal district court; they must instead
employ the administrative procedure set out in the CSRA and bring their
claims first before the agencies empowered to adjudicate federal employment
complaints.186 This process imposes its own limitations: the agency that serves
as the "first responder" for civil servant complaints, the U.S. Office of Special
Counsel (OSC), has at best a mixed record on its responses to such complaints,
with fewer than ten percent of OSC complainants reporting that they received
the action they sought from the agency in 2013.187
But more fundamentally- and more problematically for civil servants - the
kinds of claims are simply not the sort that the OSC, and the Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB), which adjudicates personnel complaints, are
competent, or even authorized, to consider. The MSPB has repeatedly declined
to rule on the constitutionality of federal statutes, holding that such power is
outside its authority as an administrative agency. 18 Moreover, even if the
agency were authorized to consider claims like the Crane plaintiffs' - regarding
the legality of executive-branch enforcement policies -those claims are a far cry
from the kind of workaday employment disputes that lie at the heart of the
Board's expertise. Indeed, this issue divided the Supreme Court as recently as
2o12: in Elgin v. Department of Treasury, a six-Justice majority held that the
CSRA divested the federal courts of jurisdiction over all claims, even
constitutional claims, brought by civil servants. 89 Three Justices dissented,
186. See Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-cv-03247, 2013 WL 8211660, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 31,
2013); see also S U.S.C. § 1214 (2012) (setting out the administrative process). This issue-
whether the CSRA precludes suit in federal district court- is the focus of the civil servants'
appeal. See Brief of Appellants, Crane v. Johnson, No. 14-10049 (5th Cir. May 16, 2014).
187. U.S. OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL, FISCAL YEAR 2013 REPORT TO CONGRESS 46 (2013),
https://osc.gov/Resources/6%2027%2014%2oANNUAL%2oREPORT.pdf [http://perma.cc
/U3XL-3K5V]. Of the complaints that OSC received in 2013 generally claims of workplace
discrimination and whistleblowing reprisal-it dismissed over ninety percent without
opening an investigation. Id. at 17. (Both numbers represent improvements from prior
administrations.) Indeed, "the consensus among Federal workers, unions, and outside
commentators" five years after the passage of the WPA "[was] that OSC remain[ed] a
barrier to achieving merit system principles in general, and whistleblower protection in
particular." H.R. REP. No. 103-769, at 15 (1994).
188. See, e.g., Malone v. Dep't of Justice, 14 M.S.P.R. 403, 4o6 (1983) ("[I]t is well settled that
administrative agencies are without authority to determine the constitutionality of
statutes.").
189. 132 S. Ct. 2126, 2140 (2012).
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arguing that the kinds of public-law claims brought by the plaintiffs in that
case should not be heard first by an agency with primary expertise in
adjudicating mundane employment disputes.190
Indeed, the dissenting Justices' objections in Elgin illustrate a broader
concern about the use of civil servant suits to vindicate rule-of-law values: the
complexities of using private-law litigation, and in particular employment
litigation, to vindicate public-law values. To be clear, similar complexities
haunt all public-law suits in the United States. As Abram Chayes observed
decades ago, "the dominating characteristic of modern federal litigation is that
lawsuits do not arise out of disputes between private parties about private
rights" but instead turn on "the vindication of constitutional or statutory
policies."191 All such lawsuits unite private objectives and public ones, and at
times subjugate the latter to the morass of rules and restrictions that govern the
former. It should not necessarily concern us that civil servant suits turn
disputes over high separation-of-powers questions into, in the words of the
Crane litigants, "garden-variety employment disputes."192
Nonetheless, the workaday doctrinal rules that govern claims like the ICE
agents' will in large part determine whether civil servant suits are anywhere
near as effective as the rosy portrait painted above, and those rules, as Part III
demonstrates, are largely unwritten. Imagine, for instance, a rule that-as
Vaughn advocates,' 93 and as clearly exists in the context of protected-disclosure
claims'94 - shields federal employees from discipline if they refuse to obey an
order that they reasonably and in good faith (but wrongly) believe violates a
law. This rule would clearly protect more civil servants, because their claims
would turn not on whether their beliefs regarding the legality of the order were
accurate, but whether they reasonably and in good faith believed them. But this
rule would be considerably less valuable from a systemic perspective, because it
would force to the forefront the private-law elements of the civil servants'
19o. See id. at 2143 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that the plaintiffs' claims "have nothing to do
with the statutory rules of federal employment, and nothing to do with any application of
the 'merit system principles' or the 'prohibited personnel practices' that the Board
administers").
191. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HAnv. L. REv. 1281, 1284
(1976).
192. Brief of Appellants at 41, Crane v. Johnson, No. 14-10049 (5th Cir. filed May 16, 2014); Brief
for the Federal Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 74, Crane v. Johnson, No. 14-10049 (5th Cir.
filed July9, 2014).
193. See Vaughn, supra note 140, at 272.
194. See, e.g., Shibuya v. Dep't of Agric., 119 M.S.P.R. 537, 549 (2o3) (ruling for a civil-servant
complainant because "he had a reasonable belief that the CFO's misuse of his government
credit card violated laws, rules, and regulations regarding government credit cards and
travel monies" (emphasis added)).
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claims, and diminish - perhaps eliminate - the public-law elements.19 What,
moreover, would it mean for a civil servant to reasonably and in good faith
believe that he had been commanded to act unlawfully? Did the Crane litigants
meet this standard?
Many judges, I suspect, would be inclined to find that the Crane litigants
did not. It is tempting to reason that any civil servant who resists an order like
the Napolitano Memo - that is, a command at the center of a high-profile
political dispute -does so not on the basis of a "good faith" belief, but instead
on an overtly ideological one. Such an act might appear not an act of duty, but
an act of politics. But we do not reason that way with respect to traditional
civil-rights plaintiffs, whose private motives are often subsumed beneath their
public ones. 96 Should we reason that way with respect to public employees?
To ask the question is to turn a spotlight on the rights and duties of civil
servants. Do those rights include the right to dissent so vocally, and in the
vocabulary of partisan politics? When Michaels, Katyal, and others envision
civil servants speaking truth to power, do they imagine those dissidents
speaking as technocrats or as ideologues? Does it matter? Our conventional
account of civil servants offers no easy answers to these questions.
One reason that the conventional account falls short is that, to the extent it
glamorizes civil servant dissidents, it imagines them as whistleblowers.
Though the right to resist is distinct from the right to disclose, to my
knowledge all state and federal statutes that codify that right place it in
immediate proximity to the whistleblower's right. '97 But civil servant resisters
like the ICE agents will often not be whistleblowers, of course, at least not as
whistleblowers are conventionally understood: they will disclose no secret
truths and provide fodder for few reforms. To the extent these resisters are
speaking at all, it is their opinions they are offering, not any inside information.
Orly Lobel has described the "deep ambivalence within judicial and statutory
195. In this sense, the doctrinal dynamics of adjudicating employment claims parallel the
dynamics present in qualified-immunity doctrine, where the jurisprudence, and much
academic commentary, has debated whether courts considering qualified-immunity
defenses should address the merits of plaintiffs' constitutional claims first, later, or never.
See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001); John C.
Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 115;
Nancy Leong, Rethinking the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts: A Reply to John Jefries, 105
Nw. U. L. REv. 969 (2011).
196. Edith Windsor, for instance, was not criticized for acting on an "ideological" motivation
rather than out of her financial need for a tax refund. See Peter Appelbome, Reveling in Her
Supreme Court Moment, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. lo, 2o12, http://www.nytimes.coM/2o12/u2/11
/nyregion/edith-windsor-gay-widow-revels-in-supreme-court-fight.html [http://perma.cc
/WU9M-E4ER].
197. See sources cited supra notes 145 and 15o.
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doctrines about the role of individuals in resisting illegality in their group
settings. " 1 8 Suits like Crane, I believe, expose the ambivalence within even
academic treatments of civil servant resistance. At their most fundamental
level, they call into question whether such resistance is legitimate, and under
what circumstances.
None of this is to suggest that civil servant suits are without promise, or
that they may not, in many circumstances, vindicate the values described
above. But it does suggest that the theory is built on an uneasy foundation. For
one, as I have noted, there are many questions about how, exactly, civil servant
suits would work -and whether, as a result, they would serve as a particularly
effective check on the executive branch. More fundamentally, however, we may
not know exactly what kind of resistance such suits would promote -nor what
kind of resistance we would want them to promote. Is there value in resistance
like Crane's? Even if there is, is a lawsuit the best way to promote it?
C. The Political Alternatives
If we took these concerns seriously, are there alternative institutional
mechanisms that would vindicate similar values: ensuring executive
compliance with congressional command, promoting dissent from civil
servants on the front lines over the metes and bounds of lawful conduct? Here
I sketch several such devices, premised not on the prospect of judicial
intervention, but on heightened dialogue and debate between the legislative
and executive branches over the legality of executive action. These mechanisms
are offered not as superior alternatives to civil servant suits; none, for instance,
offers the benefits of finality or impartiality that inhere in an Article III
proceeding. But they illustrate the importance of thinking critically and
creatively about how to channel the voices of civil servants, and how to foster
contestation over the kinds of executive action that such suits place into the
spotlight.
Suits like Crane center on the executive enforcement of congressional
commands -decision making that, as Kate Andrias has explained, lies "at the
very core of executive responsibility. '" 9 Andrias has argued for a set of
institutional reforms regarding enforcement decision making, including
increased transparency into enforcement policy and centralized presidential
oversight over major enforcement decisions."° If we believe that the
198. Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping Obligations, 97
CALIF. L. REv. 433, 434 (2009).
199. Andrias, supra note 49, at 1033.
200. Id. at 1041.
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perspective of rank-and-file civil servants is important, however, we should
ensure that such voices are incorporated into the kind of policymaking
apparatus that Andrias describes. Such a mechanism could be intra-agency: it
could be as simple as ensuring that agencies developing enforcement policies
consult a cross-section of relevant civil servants, or even of the relevant public
employee union." Or it could be inter-agency: a seat at the table within the
Executive Office of the President for designated representatives of the
institutional civil service. 2
A more expansive version of this proposal might even develop the Office of
Special Counsel into a broad-gauged advocate for the interests of civil servants.
The Office's role today is primarily adjudicative: it investigates and resolves
complaints from employees and, where appropriate, refers them to the MSPB.
But it need not be so. It is possible to imagine a revitalized OSC not simply as
an institution that looks out for the interests of whistleblowers, but as a robust
participant in public debates: submitting comments to proposed rulemakings,
advocating for civil servants at the White House and in the inter-agency
process, and even- at an extreme- serving as a litigant."°3
We might also imagine the civil service turning to a different inter-branch
actor: Congress. At several points over the last few decades -particularly in
eras of divided government- inter-branch fights have erupted over whether
Congress can authorize individual executive-branch employees to appear
before congressional panels." 4 Such testimony can serve to catalyze public
opinion and debate: when Christopher Crane, the lead Crane plaintiff and head
of the ICE officers' union, appeared before the House Judiciary Committee in
2013, he offered a scathing indictment of the Napolitano Memo, arguing that it
engendered confusion among front-line prosecutors by asking them "to
basically ignore their law books."" 5 To be sure, there are disadvantages to such
testimony, which can easily be derided as politically motivated. But permitting
201. Cf. Benjamin I. Sachs, The Unbundled Union: Politics Without Collective Bargaining, 123 YALE
L.J. 148 (2013) (proposing a heightened role for unions in politics).
2o2. See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARv. L.
REv. 1131 (2012) (describing the inter-agency process).
203. Cf Authority of the Special Counsel of the Merit Systems Protection Board to Litigate and
Submit Legislation to Congress, 8 Op. O.L.C. 30, 30 (1984) (describing Congress's
authority to authorize the "Special Counsel of the Merit Systems Protection Board to
conduct any litigation in which he is interested, except litigation in which the Special
Counsel's position would be adverse to that taken by the United States").
204. See, e.g., Authority of Agency Officials to Prohibit Employees From Providing Information
to Congress, 28 Op. O.L.C. 79 (2004) (arguing that it cannot); Constitutionality of Statute
Requiring Executive Agency to Report Directly to Congress, 6 Op. O.L.C. 632, 637 (1982)
(same).
205. Preston, supra note 89.
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civil servants to testify before Congress might secure some of the same benefits
as permitting them to sue, and at lower cost.
Of course, these proposals are subject to a set of common criticisms. First
and foremost, they may not work-at least not more effectively than lawsuits.
For one, all of these mechanisms lack the finality and impartiality associated
with the judicial process. There is no binding decision at the end of
congressional testimony, at least not by an officer charged with enforcing, to
the best of her ability, the laws and Constitution of the United States.
Moreover, both the executive and legislative processes described here are
simply less efficacious, as a matter of course, than the judicial process described
in the rest of the Note: they are notoriously sclerotic and bureaucratic by turn.
Ensuring the presence of civil servant voices in the policymaking process does
not ensure those voices will be heard. Facilitating civil-servant testimony may
not facilitate the passage of responsive legislation.
More substantively, it is not clear that aggregating the dissenting voices of
civil servants - as many of these mechanisms would - would in fact produce the
kind of checking function that civil servant suits might permit. The civil service
as an institution may care more about the terms and conditions of federal
employment than the legality of the orders they are charged with
implementing. Still, this concern may be overstated: many unions representing
rank-and-file officers develop institutional interests that go beyond pay and
benefits. These interests are evidenced not only by the Crane lawsuit, which
pitted ICE agents against reform-minded Democratic appointees, but also by
the controversy that erupted in the mid-2000s when the National Association
of Immigration Judges resisted Attorney General John Ashcroft's proposal to
reform immigration adjudication. 6 More broadly, the move to aggregate
civil-servant perspectives may even itself be flawed: it may result in the
expression of more moderate consensus positions and the minimization of true
dissent." 7
The political alternatives discussed in this section may be no better than
second-best solutions, a set of mechanisms that may substitute in for civil
servant suits but not fully replace them. The important point, though, is that
each of these proposals - like civil servant suits themselves - relies on a
different understanding of the rights and duties of civil servants, and their role
206. See Immigration Reform and the Reorganization of Homeland Defense: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, lo7th Cong. 14-16, 70-98 (2002)
(statement of Dana Marks Keener, President, Nat'l Ass'n of Immigration Judges) (arguing
for the creation of an independent immigration court, and expressing concern regarding the
politicization of immigration judges writ large). Thanks to Nicholas Parrillo for this
example.
207. I am grateful to Heather Gerken for pushing me on this point.
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in our system of separation of powers. Whether we permit civil servants to
resist unlawful commands turns in large part on whether we think their
understanding of their duties is worth heeding. How we permit them to do
so-whether through lawsuits or the more diffuse mechanisms outlined
above-may depend on how valuable we believe that understanding to be.
When a civil servant disagrees with her superior about how to interpret the
law, what should she do? Do we care what she thinks, or do we dismiss it as
her "personal opinion about what the law requires"?"°s One purpose of this
Note has been to expose these unanswered questions and to situate them
within our understanding of civil servants and their rights and duties.
CONCLUSION
This Note has advanced three related projects. The first is descriptive: it
offers the first sustained treatment of an important but previously unnoticed
form of public-law litigation, the civil servant suit. The suits described above
are novel and perplexing; they raise persistent and important questions about
bureaucracy and the rule of law. Moreover, these questions are not merely
theoretical in nature. When a county clerk steps in to defend a lawsuit, arguing
that she cannot lawfully perform same-sex marriages, how should a court
consider her request? °9 Can she challenge her statutory mandate because she
believes it to be inconsistent with what the law requires? These questions are a
growing part of contemporary public-law litigation, but they admit of no easy
answers.
The Note's second project is doctrinal: it argues that when courts ask, as
the Crane court asked, whether civil servants have standing to challenge the
statutes, regulations, and commands they are charged with enforcing, they ask
the wrong question. They should instead ask whether civil servants have the
right to raise those challenges in the first instance. Such a right, I argue, may
seem radical, but it is a real-if neglected-part of our legal landscape. Still, we
do not know what the right entails, how it is exercised, or even whether it is
desirable.
Thus the final project of this Note is a normative one: it points out that we
lack a firm account of the rights and duties of civil servants and their role in our
zo8. Crane Reply, supra note 118, at 2.
2og. Compare Whitewood v. Wolf, No. 1:13-cv-1861, slip op. at 9 (M.D. Pa. June 18, 2014)
(sharply criticizing a Pennsylvania county clerk for "us[ing] her office as a platform" to
defend the ban on same-sex marriage on the basis of her "deep personal disagreement" with
the practice), with McQuigg v. Bostic, No. 14A196 (U.S. Aug. 20, 2014) (granting a stay of a
circuit court mandate in an appeal now defended solely by Virginia county clerks).
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system of separation of powers. Civil servant suits illustrate the ameliorative
role that the civil service may play in ensuring executive compliance with the
law. But they also demonstrate that civil servant resistance is faceted and
complex, grounded as often in ideological or political considerations as it is in
technocratic ones. Is such resistance valuable? Is it legitimate? Such questions
point toward the kind of account that we need to fully evaluate the promises
and pitfalls of civil servant resistance, and of civil servant suits.
